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Ⅰ.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (PASPA),1 which barred states, with limited exceptions, from 
legalizing sports betting within the state. In 2018, however, the Court 
declared PASPA unconstitutional in Murphy v. NCAA2 as a violation of 
retained state’s rights under the 10th Amendment.3 Although the Court left 
 
 * Professor James Fischer teaches a course on Gambling Law at Southwestern Law School in Los 
Angeles. His scholarly focus is on California’s regulation of gambling, particularly, online gambling. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (1992). 
 2.  Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 200 L. Ed. 2d 854 (2018). 
 3. The PAPSA provision at issue here— prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling— 
violates the anti-commandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may 
and may not do. And this is true under either our interpretation or that advocated by respondents and the 
United States. In either event, state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress. It is as if 
federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop 
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open the option for Congress to use its commerce power to ban sports betting 
directly, Congress has shown no desire to exercise that option.4 Thus, 
presently, states have the option of legalizing sports betting within their state 
largely free of federal restraint.5 
Since the Court’s decision in Murphy v. NCAA, over 20 states have 
legalized sports betting through legislation or acquiescence.6 In California, 
Senator Bill Dodd and Assemblyman Adam Gray have introduced measures 
to the state legislature to legalize sports betting in California, but the 
measures have failed to advance in the legislature.7 There are several causes 
for inaction: (1) general opposition to gambling by some groups;8 (2) 
opposition from the Indian Tribes that operate tribal casinos within the state 
 
legislators from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy 
to imagine. Id. at 1478. 
 4. Senators Charles Schumer and Orrin Hatch introduced the “Sports Wagering Market Integrity 
Act of 2018 (S.3793), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3793/text. 
The bill was referred to committee and no further action was taken. See Adam Candee, Hatch, Schumer 
Preparing to Drop Federal Sports Betting Bill in Senate, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/26901/federal-sports-betting-bill-drop/ (reporting lack of bipartisan 
support for the measure and opposition from commercial gambling interests). 
 5. See infra Part Ⅵ of this paper (clarifying that federal statutes that criminalize sports betting 
require that the conduct be criminal in at least one relevant jurisdiction). 
 6. See Kendall Baker, The States that have Legalized Sports Betting, AXIOS (Aug. 7, 2020), 
https://www.axios.com/sports-betting-legalized-what-states-4a26bb27-d88f-4adf-a908-
6e10441ed855.html (listing states that permit some form of sports betting, other than horse racing). 
 7. Senator Bill Dodd introduced Senate Constitutional Amendment (SCA) 6 during the California 
Legislature’s 2019-2020 regular session, available at: https://trackbill.com/bill/california-senate-
constitutional-amendment-6-gambling-sports-wagering/1761818/. SCA 6 would have specifically 
addressed many of the gambling issues addressed in this paper. It was pulled from consideration by 
Senator Dodd in June, 2020. See infra note 9 (clarifying that while Senator Dodd blamed the bill’s failure 
on deadlines created by the COVID-19 pandemic, opposition from Native American tribal casino owners 
may have also played a role). See Jill R. Dorson, Not This Time: California Sports Betting Deal Dead in 
Legislature, SPORTSHANDLE (June 22, 2020), https://sportshandle.com/no-sports-betting-california/ 
(noting opposition from Native American tribal leaders to SCA 6); Assemb. Const. Amend. 16, 2019 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200ACA16 (adding that 
Senator Dodd and Assemblyman Adam Gray had previously co-sponsored a bill to legalize sports betting 
in California, and that bill also failed to move forward). 
 8. Public opposition to gambling is often led by religious organizations, which see gambling as a 
corrupting influence. See, e.g., John Stemberger, Is Gambling Morally Wrong?, FLORIDA FAMILY 
COUNCIL, https://flfamily.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Our-Opposition-to-Gambling1.pdf) (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2021) (noting that John Stemberger is the President and General Counsel for the Florida 
Family Policy Council, which defines its mission as: “Our mission is to protect and defend life, marriage, 
family and liberty through education, advocacy, and empowerment so that we live in a nation where God 
is honored, life is cherished, families thrive, and religious liberty flourishes.”); Dallin H. Oaks, Gambling, 
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS (from an address delivered on Jan. 6, 1987), 
https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/ensign/1987/06/gambling-morally-wrong-and-politically-
unwise?lang=eng (providing the viewpoint of Dallin Oaks, a leader of the Mormon religion, that 
opposition to gambling is not limited to religious concerns); ANTHONY N. CABOT & KEITH C. MILLER, 
THE LAW OF GAMBLING AND REGULATED GAMING 28-29 (Carolina Academic Press 2d ed. 2016) 
(discussing views of Patrick Devlin and William Eaditon, who argued that gambling is undesirable on 
ethical and utilitarian grounds). 
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pursuant to compacts with the State of California;9 and (3) opposition from 
operators of other legal gambling operations in California, such as 
Cardrooms and Racetracks.10 The general opposition to gambling is based 
on moral or religious grounds. The specific opposition by existing gambling 
interests is based on economics: Legalizing sports betting, particularly 
mobile sports betting, may discourage patronage at existing stationary 
gambling sites. 
The underlying assumption that both proponents and opponents of 
sports betting have is that sports betting is currently illegal in California, and 
legislation or a constitutional amendment is necessary to allow sports betting 
in the state. There is, however, a legitimate argument that online sports 
betting, if properly structured, is not illegal in California. And, if that is so, 
it is also not illegal under federal law. This article lays out that argument.  
More importantly, even if sports betting is currently illegal in 
California, the attitude towards sports betting in particular and gambling 
generally reflects California’s (and perhaps the Nation’s) oftentimes 
haphazard approach to gambling regulation. Under California law, there is 
no consistent approach to gambling. For example, gambling is promoted in 
some situations,11  while in other cases, gambling is forbidden.12 Also, in 
certain instances, gambling is merely tolerated;13 while other times, 
 
 9. See Matthew Krendell, For California Sports Betting, the Battle Between Cardrooms and Tribes 
Looms Large, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/36359/ca-
cardrooms-sports-betting/. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (presenting the example of the California State 
Lottery as a situation where gambling is promoted). 
 12. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 330a-330.9 (noting that in California it is illegal to own, possess, or 
operate a slot machine, which is defined as a “slot or card machine, appliance or mechanical device, upon 
the result of action of which money or other valuable thing is staked or hazarded, and which is operated, 
or played by placing or depositing therein” anything of value or redeemable for a thing of value and which 
is won or lost as a result of the operation of the machine, appliance, or device by reason of hazard or 
chance); infra Part II.D (explaining that the only exception permitting slot machines for gambling 
purposes is their allowance at Tribal Casinos, pursuant to tribal compacts with the state, which are 
discussed further in Part II.D).  
 13. For example, so called “loot boxes.” “Loot boxes” (or virtual prizes) allow players of online 
games to pay for the chance to acquire a prize that will help the player advance in the game. “Loot boxes” 
have been criticized as a form of gambling because of the significant chance element – most “loot boxes” 
do not contain tools that will materially help the player. See David Lazerus, Loot Boxes: Kid Stuff of 
Gambling?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2020 (“It’s only reasonable that if games employ an element of 
gambling to make money, such wagers be treated as any other form of gambling.”); Sheldon Evans, 
Pandora’s Loot Box (St. John’s Legal Studies Paper No. 20-0015, 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3733910.  See also Contra Mason v. Mach. Zone, 
Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D. Md. 2015), aff’d, 851 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2017) (outlining that courts have 
rejected the contention that “loot boxes” involved gambling). In Mason, a player had the option, using 
real money, to purchase “digital gold,” which the player could spend in the game’s virtual casino. The 
casino offered a chance to bet on a spinning wheel, which in turn could produce a virtual prize which 
might contain tools that would help the player advance in the game. The District Court and Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeal, rejected the claim that the virtual casino constituted gambling because the prizes had no 
real-dollar value attached to the prize; the prizes were only useful in the game itself and were not 
redeemable for real money, or the equivalent. The District Court, applying California law, also rejected 
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gambling is met with strong anti-enforcement action.14 California lacks a 
consistently applied and thought-out approach on how gambling should be 
addressed in the State. This is perhaps most evident when we examine the 
assumed illegality of sports betting in California. 
Ⅱ.  HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA 
When California was admitted to the Union in 1850, gambling was 
common within the State;15 however, within a few years of its admittance, 
public acceptance of gambling withered, and localized efforts to regulate 
gambling were attempted, generally with increasing success.16  
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the California legislature enacted the 
first general criminal gambling statute in 1872.17 More importantly, for 
purposes here, the legislature in 1909 enacted the predecessor to what is now 
Cal. Pen. Code § 337a. Section 337a specifically addresses bookmaking, 
which is closely associated with sports betting.18 The key provision in current 
Section 337a(a) is subsection 6, which provides that it is a crime to “lay[], 
make[], offer[] or accept[] any bet upon the result of any trial, or contest of 
skill, speed or power of endurance of person or animal, or between persons, 
animals, or mechanical apparatus.”19 The role of this provision in 
 
the contention that “loot boxes” should be treated as “slot machines” because “loot boxes” were 
exclusively “software,” whereas applications of California’s ban on slot machines to video games, e.g., 
video poker, involved both “software” and “hardware”. In other words, the court took the position that 
software downloaded into a device, such as a computer or smart phone, is not a machine, apparatus, or 
device under Cal. Penal Code § 330a. See supra note 12. 
 14. For example, internet gaming parlors, “internet cafes,” allow patrons to purchase computer time. 
Along with the purchase, patrons receive points or credits that they may use to play on devices that 
resemble traditional gambling devices, such as roulette wheels, slot machines, etc. See People ex rel. 
Green v. Grewal, 352 P.3d 275 (Cal. 2015) (noting that the court rejected contentions that these 
transactions were for amusement and upheld the District Attorney’s contention that the devices were “slot 
machines”). 
 15. Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, CAL. RSCH. BUREAU (CRB-97-003, 1997), 
https://www.standupca.org/reports/Gambling%20in%20California-1997.pdf (noting that between 1849 
and 1855 gambling was widespread in California, with both state and local governments licensing 
gambling establishments). 
 16. Id. (noting that by the 1860s, the tide had turned and gambling became subject to legal scrutiny, 
with scrutiny strengthening over the next 50 years). 
 17. Cal. Penal Code § 330 (noting that Section 330 was enacted in 1872 as part of California’s 
codification movement and criminalized a number of specific games and gambling formats). 
 18. Bookmaking is the practice of determining odds on contests or events and receiving money on 
the outcome of those contests or events. The association between bookmaking, sports betting, and 
criminal activity was a recurrent theme in legislative debates regarding sports betting. See, e.g. Virginia 
A. Seitz, Whether Proposals By Illinois And New York To Use The Internet And Out-Of-State Transaction 
Processors To Sell Lottery Tickets To In-State Adults Violate The Wire Act, Memorandum Opinion For 
The Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division 8-9 (2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/09/31/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf, at 8-9 
(noting that Congress’s overriding goal in the Wire Act (18 U.S.C. § 1084) was to stop the use of wire 
communications by bookies for sports gambling). 
 19. Cal. Penal. Code § 337a(a)6.  
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determining whether sports betting is legal or illegal in California will be 
addressed later in this paper. 
Although the California Penal Code criminalizes a number of gambling 
activities, the reality in California is that there are many expressly legal 
opportunities to gamble, subject to regulation by the State. In these contexts, 
gambling is unlawful only to the extent it is conducted outside the regulated 
environment. 
A. HORSE RACING 
Betting on horse racing was legal in California until 1909 when the 
Legislature banned pari-mutuel wagering.20 In 1933, by Initiative, the 
California Constitution was amended to allow pari-mutuel wagering on 
horse racing, effectively negating the 1909 legislative ban.21 The Legislature 
responded by amending Penal Code Section 337a to except pari-mutuel 
wagering at licensed facilities from the prohibition on pooling of bets.22 
Since that date, horse race wagering has been a legal form of gambling in 
California. In 2001, California legalized off-site betting and account 
wagering on simulcasted out of state and international horse races without 
the consent of race participants.23 This allows racing tracks to accept bets on 
horse racing anywhere in the world as long as the bets are placed on the 
racetrack premises.  
B. CARDROOMS 
Cardrooms have been in operation in California since California 
became a state.24 California cardrooms range from one to two tables to larger 
cardrooms with several hundred tables.25 Cardrooms offer a variety of 
gaming opportunities, although the dominant game is poker. California state 
 
 20. CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, GAMBLING IN THE GOLDEN STATE, 1998 FORWARD (2006). 
 21. See Proposed Amendments to Constitution and Propositions, Special Election June 27, 1933, 5 
(1933), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1313&context=ca_ballot_props 
(noting that California Proposition 3 was a legislature-sponsored measure to amend the California 
Constitution to permit betting on horse racing at state-licensed racetracks, and thereby raise state 
revenues, which had been adversely impacted by the Great Depression). 
 22. See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19(b) (outlining that the California Constitution confers authority to 
the Legislature to provide for the regulation of horse racing and horse race meetings and wagering on the 
results); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 19400-19667 (stating that the Legislature has enacted a 
comprehensive scheme to implement that authority); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19420 (noting that the 
authority to regulate horse race betting is vested in the California Horse Racing Board); Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 19440(a)(1) (clarifying that the California Horse Racing Board’s authority includes adopting rules 
and regulations for lawful wagering on horse races). 
 23. In 2001 online betting and off-tract betting were authorized by Assembly Bill 471 and took effect 
in 2002. See Assemb. B. 471, 2001 Sess. (Cal. 2001) (noting that Section 9.5 repealed the requirement in 
Bus. & Prof. Code 19595 that betting was limited to on-premises races and Section 10 permitted online 
wagering through advanced deposit accounts). 
 24. SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 107. 
 25. Id. A list of licensed California Cardrooms is maintained by the California Gambling Control 
Commission and is viewable on the Commission’s website: 
http://www.cgcc.ca.gov/?pageID=ActiveGEGE.  
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voters rejected an effort by the Cardroom industry to have on-site slot 
machines.26 Cardrooms cannot offer “house-banked” games, such as 
blackjack or baccarat. A “house backed” game is one in which the house 
(e.g., casino) participates in the game, taking on all comers, paying all 
winners, and collecting from all losers.27 Cardrooms may, however, offer 
blackjack or baccarat if other players at the table bank those games.28 In this 
form, third-party players sit at the table to act as the bank by accepting the 
“player-dealer” position – players bet against the third-party player, while 
the cardroom dealer simply distributes the cards but is not otherwise 
involved in the action. The cardroom profits from hosting the game by taking 
a percentage of the wagers (“Rake”). Under guidelines issued by the 
California Attorney General in 2016, the position of “banker” must be 
rotated among the players at the table every 60 minutes, but the offer may be 
declined, as it consistently is by the players at the table who do not want to 
assume the financial obligations of being the “bank.” If the offer is rejected, 
the “third-party player” may continue to function as the “bank” after a two-
minute recess.29 As of the writing of this paper, the California Gambling 
Control Commission is considering changes to the Attorney General’s 
approved procedures, but has not, as of yet, implemented any changes..30 
C. LOTTERY 
Lotteries in the United States date back to the colonial period. Lotteries 
helped finance the American Revolution;31 indeed, it may be said America 
owes its existence to a lottery.32 This did not, however, endear lotteries to the 
 
 26. See California General Election Official Voter Information Guide, 8 (2004), 
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2236&context=ca_ballot_props (noting 
that while the measure was soundly defeated, Proposition 68 on the November 2004 General Election 
ballot would have permitted race tracks and card rooms to have slot machines, subject to the condition 
that Native American Casino operators failed to agree to a punitive increase to the amount of fees they 
would have to pay the State of California to operate their Tribal casinos).  
 27. Sullivan v. Fox, 235 Cal. Rptr. 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1987). 
 28. Cal. Penal Code § 330.11. 
 29. Advisory Letter from Kamala Harris, Attorney General of the State of California (June 30, 2016), 
to all California Gambling Establishments, https://www.uspoker.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Rotation-Letter-CA.pdf. 
 30. Letter from Stephanie K. Shimazu, State of California, Department of Justice, Regulations 
Workshop –December 18, 2019, https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/gambling/workshop-letter-
120319.pdf (providing the text of the proposed new regulations). 
 31. Lotteries became an issue in the drive for independence of the colonies. The colonies protested 
the crown’s rules for holding lotteries. In 1769, the crown tried to prevent lotteries from occurring without 
its permission. Once the war of independence started, the Continental Congress voted for a $10 million 
lottery to finance the war. The lottery had to be abandoned, however, because it was too large and the 
tickets could not be sold.  Dunstan, supra note 15, at Part II.  See also Becky Little, Lottery Tickets Helped 
Fund America’s 13 Colonies, INSIDE HIST. (updated Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/13-
colonies-funding-lottery. 
 32. MATTHEW SWEENEY, THE LOTTERY WARS: LONG ODDS, FAST MONEY, AND THE BATTLE OVER 
AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION 15-20 (2009) (noting that the Virginia Company’s Jamestown settlement, 
England’s first permanent settlement in North America, was largely sustained by a lottery). 
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public or politicians. America’s relationship with lotteries has zigzagged 
between love and hate.33 
Lotteries fell into disfavor in the first half of the Nineteenth Century 
due to evidence of corruption and fraudulent operation of some lotteries.34 
The demise of lotteries was also driven by a significant revival of religious 
attitude during the “Great Awakening” that began in the 1820s and lasted 
through much of the Nineteenth Century.35 The main exception was the 
Louisiana Lottery that commenced in 1868 shortly after the Civil War and 
lasted, in one form or another, until 1907.36 The Louisiana Lottery had a 
national draw because players could participate by entering through the U.S. 
mail. However, the Louisiana Lottery was essentially killed when Congress 
outlawed the use of the mail to purchase lottery tickets.37 After the demise of 
the Louisiana Lottery, no legal lotteries operated in the United States for 
almost 60 years.  
Recently, Americans have fallen back in love with lotteries.38 In 1964, 
New Hampshire revived the lottery.39 Since then, the great majority of states 
have embraced lotteries. As of 2010, 43 states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands offer government operated lotteries.40 
For fiscal 2016, United States lottery sales totaled $80.5 billion.41 New York 
was the largest ($9.69 billion), followed by California ($6.28 billion).42 
 
 33. See supra notes 31 and 32.  
 34. Dunstan, supra note 15, at Part II. 
 35. As moral rigor increased in this field [Temperance], so did it in others. The Sabbath was 
protected by an organization which became national in 1826. Dancing and theater-going became 
increasingly suspect. Lotteries, which once had financed buildings for both Harvard and Yale and 
innumerable churches, also fell under the ban. Obscenity and profanity came to be defined in far more 
religious terms, and in due course these evils aroused the crusading impulse of other moral reformers. 
Gradually, American would come to identify Puritanism and blue nosed Victorianism. SYDNEY E. 
AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 415-454 (Yale University Press 1st ed. 
1972) (noting that although the primary social concern during this Awakening was Temperance, religious 
revivalism included gambling in its ban). 
 36. See CABOT & MILLER, supra note 8, at 677-78 
 37. Section 3894, Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2659 (1890). The statute was upheld 
in Ex Parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892). The statute is presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1302. In 1895, 
Congress expanded this ban on the use of the mail by banning the interstate transport of lottery tickets, 
now codified at 18 U.S.C. §1301. With the reemergence of state-run lotteries in the second half of the 
twentieth century (see text and notes 38-43), in 1975 Congress enacted legislation exempting state-run 
lotteries from the bans noted above. Pub. L. 93-583, 88 Stat. 1916 (1975), now codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§1307. 
 38. SIMMONS, supra note 20, at 87 (“Lotteries are the most popular of all legal wagering games.”). 
 39. Id.; CABOT & MILLER, supra note 8, at 678. The origins of the New Hampshire lottery are 
discussed on the lottery’s website: https://www.nhlottery.com/About-Us.  
 40. See Lottery Payouts and State Revenue, 2010, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/lottery-payouts-and-state-revenue-
2010.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2021) (reporting gross lottery revenues of $53 billion in 2010, but note 
that the number of states participating in lotteries has increased since 2010). 
 41. S. Lock, Sales of State Lotteries in the United States from 2009 to 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 2, 
2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/215265/sales-of-us-state-and-provincial-lotteries/. 
 42. S. Lock, Sales of Lotteries in the United States in 2020, by state, STATISTIA (Mar. 4, 2021), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/388238/sales-of-lotteries-by-state-us/. 
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Several lotteries are multi-state in that sales from different states are 
aggregated for a common drawing e.g., “Mega-Millions” and “Powerball.” 
The multi-state lotteries are operated by the Multi-State Lottery Association 
and presently consist of 34 states, including California.43  
D. TRIBAL CASINOS 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IRGA)44 provided the foundation 
for the dramatic growth of commercial casinos owned by Native-American 
tribes (Tribal Casinos). IRGA divides gambling into three classes: Class 1 
consists of traditional tribal gambling games; Class 2 consists of bingo and 
non-house banked games, such as poker; Class 3 consists of commercial 
casino gambling, such as slot machines, video poker, house-backed table 
games, etc. IRGA allows each federally recognized tribe to enter into a 
compact with the state to permit Class 3 type gambling and requires the state 
to negotiate in “good faith” regarding proposed compacts.45 In 2000, 
California voters approved constitutional Initiative 1A, which authorized the 
governor to negotiate compacts, subject to legislative approval.46 Games 
allowed by Proposition 1A include: (1) slot machines, (2) lottery games, and 
(3) house-backed and percentage card games.47 As of November 2016, the 
Legislature has approved 74 compacts.48 California tribal casinos had 
gambling revenues in 2016 of $8.4 billion, which was approximately 25% of 
total Tribal casino gambling revenue in the United States.49 By comparison, 
 
 43. See MULTI-STATE LOTTERY ASSOCIATION (MUSL), http://www.musl.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 
2021) (listing the members of MUSL, a non-profit, government-benefit association owned and operated 
by its member lotteries). 
 44. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.; Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: 
Background and Legislative History, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99 (2010) (noting that the Mr. Ducheneaux was 
lead counsel on Indian affairs in the House during the period the legislation was drafted, considered, and 
ultimately enacted, and that IRGA was the culmination of a contentious, politically divisive dispute 
between the States and Native American tribes regarding the rights of the tribes to offer gambling games 
on reservation lands). 
 45. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (requiring that State and Indian tribe enter into a compact before Indian 
tribe can offer Class III gambling games); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (requiring State to negotiate in 
“good faith” with Indian tribe to enter into a compact permitting Indian tribe to offer Class III gambling 
games). 
 46. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19. 
 47. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(f)(amended by Proposition 1A): 
“Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state law, the Governor is 
authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation 
of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage card games by federally 
recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Accordingly, slow 
machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card games are hereby permitted to be conducted 
and operated on tribal lands subject to those compact.”  
Available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=CONS& 
division=&title=&part=&chapter=&article=IV.  
 48. A list of approved compacts is maintained by the California Gambling Control Commission, 
available at http:/www.cgcc.ca.gov/?pageID=compacts.  
 49. Mark Anderson, California Tribal Casino Growth Outpaces Nation, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (Oct. 
12, 2018), available at https://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2018/10/12/california-tribal-
casino-growth-outpaces-nation.html.  
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Nevada’s gambling revenue in 2016 was $10.76 billion.50 It would not be an 
understatement to say that Tribal Casinos are  large and growing businesses 
in California.51 
E. OTHER FORMS OF GAMBLING 
California permits limited forms of gambling by organizations exempt 
from taxation under California law.52 The types of games allowed include: 
(1) bingo, (2) poker, and (3) raffles. These games are subject to regulation, 
but the extent to which the State enforces them against the sponsoring 
organization is unclear. For example, charitable poker fundraisers require 
annual registration with the Bureau of Gambling Control, are limited to one 
fundraiser per year, have limits on prizes, the event must retain 90% of the 
fundraising revenues, and require a certain amount of record keeping.53 
There are no reported cases of recent prosecution or law enforcement activity 
related to these requirements. It appears that under-enforcement (perhaps 
non-enforcement is a more appropriate term) is the norm. 
F. SPORTS BETTING 
Sports betting does not fit into any of these categories of legal gambling 
in California. As noted earlier, the consistent position uttered by 
commentators is that sports betting is illegal where it has not been made 
legal.54 But perhaps sports betting does not need to be made legal because it 
is possible that sports betting is not illegal. This paper answers this question 
by examining the three sources of law that could make sports betting illegal 
 
 50. Jessica Welman, Nevada Casinos Bring in Over $25 Billion in 2016, PLAY NEVADA (Jan. 12, 
2017), available at https://www.playnevada.com/1595/2016-casino-revenue-up-nevada/.   
 51. That growth has been significantly slowed by the COVID-19 pandemic which has devastated 
the hospitality industry, of which casino-style gambling is a part. California tribal casinos complied with 
Governor Newsom’s initial shutdown orders. Lately, however, Tribal Casinos have reopened, defying the 
Governor’s orders. Thomas Fuller, Asserting Sovereignty, Indian Tribal Casino’s Defy California’s 
Governor and Reopen, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/california-virus-casinos.html.  
 52. Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19 (f). Eligible organizations must be exempt from taxation under one or 
more provisions of Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 23701(a), (b), (d) – (g), (k), (w). 
 53. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 19985-87. 
 54. See e.g., CYBERCRIME AND SECURITY, § 4A:8, Attempts to Amend UIGEA and Theory of 
Amendments (Pauline Reich, ed. 2005) (noting that the United States Department of Justice continues to 
hold the view that all online gambling is illegal, except for horse racing and state lotteries, when the 
gambling touches a jurisdiction where gambling is illegal). A few states have directly addressed online 
gambling. See, e.g., Eloise Gratton, Aiding & Abetting Liability Exposure of Affiliate Program Service 
Providers Under the New US Internet Gambling Law, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 15 (2007) (listing 11 states). 
A number of states have expressly authorized online gambling. See, e.g., PLAY USA, available at 
https://www.playusa.com/us/ (identifying four states as permitting online casino gambling; five states as 
permitting legal online poker; and, 6 states as permitting legal online sports betting). Of course, states 
vary as to the extent such betting is allowed. In California, there is no specific rule making online 
gambling legal or illegal. Rather as noted by one commentator: “[T]here has been an absence of regulation 
with California, and the failure to designate online gambling as legal or illegal has led to a flood of online 
gambling websites, both legitimate and illicit.” Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next 
Generation, 46 W. ST. L. REV. 6, 9 (2019). 
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under California law: (1) the State Constitution; (2) the State Penal Code; 
and (3) the State Common law. The paper then addresses how the status of 
sports betting under California law affects the impact of federal law, 
particularly the Wire Act, on the legality of sports betting in California.  
Ⅲ.  THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
The California Constitution does not directly permit or ban gambling 
per se; rather, its provisions set out limits on the legislative power. The 
Constitution’s gambling provisions do not criminalize conduct, nor do they 
per se make gambling illegal. However, the provisions do express a view as 
to whether and how gambling should be allowed in California and, therefore, 
are worthy of review.  
Beginning with the State’s first Constitution in 1849, the California 
Constitution has expressed a limitation on the Legislature’s ability to legalize 
gambling. In 1849, the prohibition was expressly limited to “lotteries”:  
 
No lottery shall be authorized by this State, nor shall the sale of lottery 
tickets be allowed.55 
The provision did not define the term “lottery.” In 1879, the prohibition 
was expanded to include “gift enterprises”:  
The Legislature shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift 
enterprises for any purposes….56 
 
Again, no definition of “lotteries” or “gift enterprises” was provided.57 
Since the 1879 gambling provision, the California Constitution has been 
frequently amended to allow horse track betting, government run lotteries, 
tribal casinos. It has also banned Nevada and New Jersey-type casino 
gaming. The current ban is found in Art. 4, §19.58 Interestingly, the original 
 
 55. Cal. Const. of 1849, art. IV § 27, https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/hornbeck_usa_3_d/. 
 56. Cal. Const. of 1879, art. IV § 26, https://www.cpp.edu/~jlkorey/calcon1879.pdf. 
 57. A “gift enterprise” is generally understood to be a type of lottery. An example would be the sale 
for $5.00 of an item with a known value, e.g., $1.00, coupled with an item (Gift) having a value between 
$1.00 and $21.00. Prohibitions against “gift enterprises” were usually directed at business practices 
deemed unethical because the gambling element would boost sales. Recent Cases, Trading Stamps – 
“Gift-Enterprise,” 14 YALE L. J. 120 (1904). When, however, the term was included in a constitutional 
limitation on legislative power, the term “gift enterprises” may be seen as an effort to interdict all forms 
of lotteries. Opinion of the Justices, 795 So. 2d 630, 638 (Ala. 2001). A modern variant of a “gift 
enterprise” is a “loot box.” “Loot boxes” are found in online video games. A player can purchase a box 
that contains a number of items having a range of values. The value of one of the items may or may not 
be known, but the lure is the prospect of acquiring an item whose value exceeds the purchase price. See 
Note 13, discussing “loot boxes.” 
 58. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19 currently provides:  
“(a) The Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries, and shall prohibit the sale of lottery 
tickets in the State.  
(b) The Legislature may provide for the regulation of horse races and horse race meetings and 
wagering on the results.  
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language barring lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets remains. At the same 
time, in another section, the Legislature is authorized to establish a 
“California State Lottery.” More on this in a moment.59  
Let us start at the top—what does it mean to ban “lotteries” and the sale 
of “lottery tickets”? How does one define “lottery”? Modern dictionaries 
generally provide two definitions – one narrow, the other broad. The narrow 
definition is consistent with modern, state-sponsored lottery play in the 
United States: “a drawing of lots in which prizes are distributed to the 
winners among persons buying a chance.”60 The broader definition is: “an 
event or affair whose outcome is or seems to be determined by chance.61 The 
question is, which definition is intended in Section 19?62 
 
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Legislature by statute may authorize cities and 
counties to provide for bingo games, but only for charitable purposes. (d) Notwithstanding 
subdivision (a), there is authorized the establishment of a California State Lottery. 
(e) The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit, casinos of the type currently 
operating in Nevada and New Jersey.  
(f) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state law, the Governor 
is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for 
the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage 
card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance 
with federal law. Accordingly, slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card 
games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands subject to those 
compacts. 
(f)1 Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Legislature may authorize private, nonprofit, 
eligible organizations, as defined by the Legislature, to conduct raffles as a funding 
mechanism to provide support for their own or another private, nonprofit, eligible 
organization’s beneficial or charitable works, provided that (1) at least 90 percent of the 
gross receipts from the raffle go directly to beneficial or charitable purposes in California, 
and (2) any person who receives compensation in connection with the operation of a raffle 
is an employee of the private nonprofit organization that is conducting the raffle. The 
Legislature, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, may amend the 
percentage of gross receipts required by this subdivision to be dedicated to beneficial or 
charitable purposes by means of a statute that is signed by the Governor.”  
 59. In 1984, California voters amended the California Constitution to permit a state operated lottery. 
See supra text accompanying notes 76-8. The sale of private lottery tickets remains banned, except as a 
permitted raffle. See infra text accompanying notes 52-3. 
 60. See WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 681 (1977). At least one California court has 
read the Constitutional ban on lotteries broadly. In Finster v. Keller, 18 Cal. App. 3d 836, 842 (Ct. App. 
1971), the court stated that the current prohibition in the California Constitution was not limited to 
“classical lotteries,” i.e., the narrow definition. That statement was, however, dicta as the case involved 
the application of Penal Code Section 319’s ban on lotteries, which is not restricted by Art. 4, §19 of the 
California Constitution. More importantly, the reasoning of Finster is directly inconsistent with 
subsequent decisions by the California Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Both forms of lotteries were in existence when the 1849 California Constitution was adopted in 
1850. Lotteries of the first type were commonly used to fund projects, the project funds being the residue 
after a portion of the funds collected was paid to lottery winners. See, e.g., Transatlantic Literature And 
Transivity, 1780 – 1850 (Annika Bautz and Kathryn Gray, eds. 2017) (noting that the British Museum 
was founded through a lottery). Lotteries of the second type were evidence by land lotteries, where 
participants entered for a chance to be awarded land. See, e.g., David F. Weyman, Peopling The Land By 
Lottery?, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 835, 839-40 (1991) (describing lottery of land seized by Georgia from the 
Cherokee nation). 
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The arguments for the narrow definition are primarily historical. When 
the term first appeared in 1849, the popular, political culture had begun to 
turn away from legalized lotteries, which theretofore had been used for 
fundraising purposes. At the 1849 Constitutional convention, several 
delegates spoke to the issue of lotteries. Several delegates spoke in favor of 
lotteries, noting the revenue that a lottery could generate to fund state 
operations.63 However, the greater weight of delegates spoke against a state-
run lottery because many believed the State should raise revenues by more 
honorable means.64 For example, despite California being considered a 
gambling community, Mr. Halleck did not think the State’s Constitution 
should create a “gambling state” that raised revenues by “immoral” means.65 
Furthermore, Mr. Dimmick also voiced that while “gambling” might be 
permissible, using a lottery to raise state revenues would constitute a great 
evil.66  
Those who favored barring the Legislature from authorizing a state-run 
lottery interpreted “lottery” in its narrow sense – as a means of raising 
revenue by a state-sponsored game of drawing lots to win a prize. This 
narrow interpretation was supported by the actual practice in California 
when the Constitution was adopted. Immediately preceding the adoption of 
the 1849 Constitution, gambling (other than lotteries in the narrow sense) 
was widespread and accepted in California. It would not be until after the 
Civil War that popular attitudes would coalesce against gambling, and 
restrictions would be put in place by the Legislature in the 1870s and 
thereafter. On the other hand, the historical process by which Section 19 has 
been amended and altered suggests that the term “lotteries” may have a 
narrow or broad interpretation. Let us look at each of the exceptions. 
Section 19(b) allows the Legislature to regulate horse racing and 
wagering on the results.67 The provision does not reference Section 19(a), 
which bans lotteries, as do other subsections of Section 19. Section 19(b) 
was adopted in 1933 to replace a prior ban on wagering on horse racing that 
California adopted early in the Twentieth Century.68 The move to allow 
wagering on horse races was a Depression-era effort to increase state 
revenues. To do so, the prior legislative ban needed to be rescinded, which 
it ultimately was. If the term “lotteries” is narrowly defined, a constitutional 
amendment was unnecessary; a statutory Initiative would have been 
 
 63. J. Ross Browne, Report of the Debates on the Convention on the Formation of the State 
Constitution, In September and October, The Making of Modern Law: Primary Sources, 1620-1926, at 
90-91 (1849) (statements of Mr. Price and Mr. McCarver). 
 64. Id. (statement of Mr. Dent). 
 65. Id. (statement of Mr. Halleck). 
 66. Id. at 91-92 (statement of Mr. Dimmick). 
 67. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(b) provides: “The Legislature may provide for the regulation of horse 
race meetings and wagering on the results.” 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 20-3. 
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sufficient to undo the 1909 legislative ban on pari-mutuel wagering.69 If, 
however, “lotteries” is broadly construed to include all games of chance, a 
constitutional Initiative would be necessary to permit the Legislature to 
allow and regulate pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing. The analysis and 
arguments accompanying Proposition 3, the ballot Initiative that became 
Section 19(b), contains no discussion of why a constitutional, as opposed to 
statutory, Initiative was used to restore horse race “wagering” in California.70  
Section 19(c), which is expressly set out as an exception to Section 
19(a), permits the Legislature to allow cities and counties to authorize bingo 
games for charitable purposes.71 Section 19(f), also set out as an exception 
to Section 19(a), and permits the Legislature to allow private, non-profit 
organizations to offer raffles under limited circumstances.72 Both bingo and 
raffles are based on the drawing of lots in which prizes are distributed to 
winners among the persons buying a chance. As games possibly within the 
 
 69. See supra text and notes 20-21 (noting that the term “pari-mutuel” was not defined in Proposition 
3. The Legislature in implementing Proposition 3 created the California Horse Racing Board and 
authorized the Board to issue regulations defining permissible pari-mutuel wagering). See Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 19411 (defining pari-mutuel wagering generally as: 
““Parimutuel wagering” is a form of wagering in which bettors either purchase tickets of 
various denominations, or issue wagering instructions leading to the placement of wagers, on 
the outcome of one or more horse races. The association distributes the total wagers comprising 
each pool, less the amounts retained for purposes specified in this chapter, to winning betters 
based on the official race results.”  
 70. See Proposed Amendments to Constitution and Propositions, June 27, 1933 at 5-61 (arguments 
supporting and opposing). 
 71. Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19(c) provides: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Legislature by 
statute may authorize cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only for charitable purposes.” 
 72. Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19(f) provides: 
Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Legislature may authorize private, nonprofit, eligible 
organizations, as defined by the Legislature, to conduct raffles as a funding mechanism to 
provide support for their own or another private, nonprofit, eligible organization’s beneficial 
and charitable works, provided that (1) at least 90 percent of the gross receipts from the raffle 
go directly to beneficial or charitable purposes in California, and (2) any person who receives 
compensation in connection with the operation of a raffle is an employee of the privates 
nonprofit organization that is conducting the raffle. The Legislature, two-thirds of the 
membership of each  house concurring, may amend the percentage of gross receipts by this 
subdivision to be dedicated to beneficial or charitable purposes by means of a statute that is 
signed by the Governor. 
Art. IV, § 19 has two subparagraphs (f)s because two ballot initiatives to amend Art. IV, § 19 were 
approved by voters at the same general election. See Cal. Const., Art. II, §10 and Art. 18 § 4, which 
address this issue. Charitable organizations are limited to the types of gambling games they may offer. 
Cal. Pen. Code § 337(j)(e)(i): 
[A]ny poker or pai gow game, and any other game player with cards or tiles, or both, and 
approved by the Bureau of Gambling Control, and any game of chance, including any gaming 
device, played for currency, check, credit, or any other thing of value that is not prohibited and 
made unlawful by statute or local ordinance.  
Again, if the term “lottery” in Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(a) was broadly construed to refer to any game 
of change, the legislative authorization in Penal Code Section 337(j)(e)(f) would be void. If, however, the 
term “lottery” is narrowly construed the legislative authorization is valid. That no one has ever questioned 
the legality of Section 337(j)(e)(f) is consistent with the view that the term “lottery” is understood to have 
the narrow interpretation described in this paper.  
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narrow definition of “lottery,” an exception would naturally reference the 
ban on “lotteries” of Section 19(a). 
Sections 19(e) expressly bar the Legislature from allowing (and 
expressly requires the Legislature to prohibit) Nevada and New Jersey type 
casinos.73 Putting aside the definitional issue of what is a “Nevada or New 
Jersey type casino,” the adoption of the provision raises some interesting 
questions as to the proper scope of the term “lotteries” in Section 19(a). 
Under the narrow interpretation of  “lotteries,” Section 19(e) is a necessary 
extension to bar casino-style gambling. On the other hand, under a broad 
interpretation of “lotteries,” Section 19(e) is considered redundant and 
unnecessary. Giving the term “lotteries” a narrow interpretation avoids 
redundancy and assures that both Sections 19(a) and 19(e) have independent 
and stand-alone meanings. Avoiding redundancy and giving language in the 
Constitution independent meaning are often stated and valid goals of 
interpretation.74 These guidelines also apply to ballot propositions.75  
Sections 19(c), which permits a state run lottery, and Section 19(e), 
which bars commercial casinos, were part of Proposition 37 – The State 
Lottery Ballot Proposition, which the voters adopted in 1984.76 The 
Proposition  was an Initiative constitutional amendment that permits a 
California State Lottery. The Legislative Analyst analyzed Proposition 37, 
and a summary of their findings was mailed to registered voters.  The 
Analysis explained that the State Constitution prohibits lotteries, the games 
proposed are lottery-type games, and a constitutional amendment is 
necessary to permit a California state lottery. The Analysis does not explain 
why the authorization is written as an exception to Section 19(a). Nor does 
it explain why a specific constitutional ban on “Nevada and New Jersey type 
 
 73. Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(e) provides: “The Legislature has no power, to authorize and shall 
prohibit, casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” Section 19(e) was added in 
1984 when California voters adopted a constitutional initiative authorizing a state operated lottery. See 
text and notes 76-77.   
 74. Id.; See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation Of Legal Texts 
179 (2012) (stating that legal texts should be interpreted to avoid surplusage). This principle is 
consistently applied to both constitutional text (See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (“When 
interpreting the Constitution, we begin with the unremarkable presumption that every word in the 
document has independent meanings, and that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added”) 
and statutes (see San Jose v. Superior Court, 850 P.2d 62 Cal. 1993) (“In using two quite different terms 
… the Legislature presumably intended to refer to two distinct concepts …. We ordinarily reject 
interpretations that render particular terms of the statute mere surplusage, instead giving every word some 
significance.”)).  
 75. People v. Lin, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818, 823 (Ct. App. 2018): 
“The court interprets a ballot proposition as it would a statute by the Legislature. The Court 
begins with the language of the proposition itself, giving the words their ordinary meaning and 
construing this language in the context of the statute and initiative as a whole. If the language 
is not ambiguous, we presume the voters intended the meaning apparent from the language, 
and we may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not apparent 
from that language. If the language is ambiguous, courts may consider ballot summaries and 
arguments in determining the voters’ intent and understanding of a ballot measure.” 
 76. California State Lottery Act of 1984, available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_ 
displayText.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&division=1.&title=2.&part=&chapter=12.5.&article=1.  
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casinos” was necessary.77 Most of the Analysis speaks towards the economic 
benefits of a lottery.78 One suspects the specific ban on “Nevada and New 
Jersey type casinos” was included to allay fears that approval of Proposition 
37 would permit commercial casinos in California. That, of course, is 
supposition, but it is consistent with the narrow interpretation of the term 
“lotteries,” and the essential equating of the type of games Proposition 37 
would allow with the then existing prohibition on lotteries in Section 19(a). 
Nowhere in the Analysis does the Legislative Analyst address a residue role 
for Section 19(a) if Proposition 37 is approved. In fact, the only specific 
future ban on gambling mentioned is that against “Nevada and New Jersey 
type casinos.” One could see Proposition 37 as effectively hollowing out 
Section 19(a), leaving it essentially a shell provision, i.e., one without 
meaningful content except to the extent it would bar the Legislature from 
allowing private lotteries or “Nevada and New Jersey type casinos.” 
A recent California Supreme Court decision provides some support for 
the view that (1) the term “lotteries” in Section 19(a) should be narrowly 
construed, and (2), as narrowly construed, Section 19(a) has been effectively 
eviscerated by Proposition 37. In 1998, California voters at the November 
General Election approved Proposition 5, a statutory Initiative, which would 
have allowed slot machines and house banked games at Tribal casinos.79 
However, less than a year after its approval, in Hotel Employees & 
Restaurant Employees International Union v. Davis (Hotel Employees),80 
Proposition 5 was struck down on the ground that it violated Art. 4, Section 
19(e) – the no “Nevada or New Jersey type casino” provision that had been 
added to the State Constitution by Proposition 37.81 The California Supreme 
Court made no effort to bring Proposition 5 within a broad reading of the 
term “lotteries” in Section 19(a). Rather, the focus was on whether Tribal 
casinos were like “Nevada and New Jersey type casinos.” The court 
concluded they were and declared Proposition 5 unconstitutional.82 
 
 77. See Proposition 37, 1984. https://ballotpedia.org/California_State_Lottery_Act,_Proposition_ 
37_(1984).  According to the analysis supplied to the voters, Proposition 37 would constitutionalize the 
existing statutory ban on casino style gambling in California, but the reason for doing so was not 
addressed. Proposition 37 Analysis By Legislative Analyst, available at 
https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1926&context=ca_ballot_props.    
 78. See William G. Hamm, Voter Information Guide for 1984 General Election, 46 – 48 (1984). 
 79. Proposition 5 was titled: “The Tribal Government Gaming and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act 
of 1988.” 
 80. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Intern. Union v. Davis, 21 Cal. 4th 585 (1999). 
 81. See supra note 78. 
 82. See supra note 79 at 589. Ironically, while presented as a statutory Initiative, which required 5% 
of the votes cast for Governor at the last election, see Cal. Const., art. II § 8(b); see also Cal. Elec. Code 
§ 9035), Proposition 5 received sufficient signatures to qualify as a constitutional Initiative, which 
requires 8% of the votes case for the Governor at the last preceding election. Id. Proposition 5 received 
over 1 million signatures. Approximately 433,000 signatures were necessary to qualify as a statutory 
Initiative; approximately 690,000 signatures were necessary to qualify as a constitutional Initiative. The 
Secretary of State’s Office ceased the signature verification process once it determined that the measure 
easily qualified as a statutory initiative. Thus, while the proponents of Proposition 5 submitted sufficient 
signatures to have qualified the Proposition had it been submitted as a constitutional initiative; we do not 
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One must be careful not to read too much into an opinion, particularly 
silence.83 It is, nonetheless, interesting that the court focused on the “Nevada 
and New Jersey type casino” ban and ignored another possible argument to 
support its position, that the games allowed by Proposition 5 were games of 
chance barred by Section 19(a) because they were “private lotteries” not 
within the allowance of Section 19(c).84 On the other hand, the court’s silence 
on this point is entirely understandable if (1) the term “lotteries” in Section 
19(a) is narrowly interpreted or (2) Proposition 37 essentially eviscerated 
Section 19(a). If either (1) or (2) applied, the types of gambling envisioned 
by Proposition 5 would not violate Section 19(a). If the term “lotteries” is 
narrowly construed, it does not include gambling games that do not involve 
drawing lots in which the winner is awarded prizes. Card games, particularly 
“house banked” games, slot machines, and roulette do not involve the 
drawing of lots to determine a winner.85 Likewise, Proposition 37 made 
Section 19(a) prohibition on conducting lotteries a nullity because the history 
of the prohibition is that it was directed at state-run lotteries. Thus the focus 
on Section 19(e) makes sense because Section 19(a) no longer has 
meaningful force and effect because Section 19(c) authorizes a state-run 
lottery.  
Trying to assess the scope of the current ban on gambling in the 
California Constitution is problematic for the reasons noted above. However, 
it seems safe to say that the State Constitution affects sports betting only if 
the term “lotteries” in Section 19(a) is either broadly interpreted or sports 
betting is analogous to “Nevada and New Jersey type casinos.” No California 
decision directly gives the term “lotteries” a broad interpretation.  Rather, 
the discussion that exists about the term “lotteries” construes it narrowly. 
What about the ban on “Nevada and New Jersey type casinos”? The Supreme 
Court in Hotel Employees went to some lengths to conclude that some of the 
gambling games Proposition 5 authorized California Native American tribes 
to offer in their Tribal casinos were the types of games offered in “Nevada 
 
know if the proponents submitted sufficient valid signatures to place the Proposition on the ballot as a 
constitutional Initiative.  
 83. It is often said that decisions are not authority for propositions not considered. See People v. 
Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 1071 (1989); see also McDowel and Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs, 13 Cal. 
4th 475, 485 (1996). The issue here, however, is not authority, but whether the court’s actual practice 
leads to legitimate inferences as to the meaning of the term “lottery” and the continued viability of that 
term in art. IV, § 19.  
 84. See W. Telcon, Inc., v. California State Lottery, 13 Cal. 4th 475, 485 (1996) (prior opinion where 
court stated that the types of games permitted by Proposition 5 were the antithesis of lottery games). In 
Hotel Employees, the court only addressed this point in assessing whether Tribal casinos offering games 
authorized by Proposition 5 would fall under the ban of Nevada or New Jersey type casinos in Art. 4 § 
19(e), see supra note 80.  
 85. Supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. This interpretation is also consistent with the 
allowance of charities to offer games of chance for fundraising purposes. That allowance would not be 
valid if the term “lottery” in Section 19(a) was read broadly because the express exceptions in Sections 
19(c) and 19(f) are limited to Bingo and Raffles. 
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and New Jersey type casinos.”86 Sports betting is offered at many Nevada 
casinos. Under Hotel Employees, sports betting would likely be a gambling 
game of the type offered by the “Nevada and New Jersey type casinos”; 
however, this simply begs the question: what makes a gambling 
establishment a “Nevada and New Jersey type casino”? If a sports bar takes 
bets, does that make it a “Nevada and New Jersey type casino”? 
Traditionally, casinos have been gambling establishments that offer a variety 
of gambling games. In Hotel Employees, Proposition 5 would have allowed 
Tribal casinos to offer a variety of gambling games. The Tribal casinos were 
designed to emulate Nevada casinos, and the court had little difficulty 
concluding that the type of gambling establishment Proposition 5 would 
allow was equivalent to that barred by Section 19(e).87 Would a court see a 
dedicated sports betting site as equivalent to a “Nevada and New Jersey type 
casino”? Sports betting is not a “lottery” as that term is understood in Hotel 
Employees, but whether one gambling game or collection of gambling games 
would qualify the gambling establishment as a “Nevada or New Jersey type” 
casino is unclear and left unanswered by Hotel Employees. However, if it 
was determined that a sports betting facility qualified as a “Nevada or New 
Jersey type casino” under Art. 4, § 19(e), that would bring into play the 
constitutional requirement that the Legislature did not authorize the activity. 
This would strongly suggest that maintaining a sports betting facility, while 
not illegal per se, violates California public policy. The argument that a 
sports betting facility is equivalent or akin to a “Nevada or New Jersey type 
casino” is difficult to square with the discussion in Hotel Employees that 
emphasized the offering of multiple games of chance within the building, 
room, or facility.88 It would be even more difficult to extend the comparison 
to online sports betting facilities that do not have a traditional physical 
presence as exemplified by brick-and-mortar casinos. For these reasons, it is 
unlikely that a stand-alone sports betting facility should be seen as a “Nevada 
or New Jersey type casino.” 
As noted earlier, the California Constitution, except with respect to 
“Nevada and New Jersey type casinos,” does not directly prohibit gambling. 
The California Constitution now places a limit on the power of the 
Legislature to authorize private lotteries and “Nevada and New Jersey type 
 
 86. Supra note 80 at 605. 
“Thus, a casino of “the type. . . operating in Nevada and New Jersey” may be understood, with 
reasonable specificity, as one or more buildings, rooms, or facilities, whether separate or 
connected, that offer gambling activities including those statutorily prohibited in California, 
especially banked table games and slot machines …. Proposition 5, including its model 
tribal/state compact, authorizes what would amount to prohibited casinos. With their tribal 
gaming terminal and grandfathered class III card games, tribal gaming facilities authorized 
under the measure would constitute facilities that offer gambling activities including those 
statutorily prohibited to card clubs in California in 1984, especially banked table games and 
slot machines.” 
 87. Id. at 605-08. 
 88. See supra text accompanying note 86. 
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casinos.” In this sense, activities the Constitution bars the Legislature from 
authorizing may be seen as contrary to California public policy. If the 
Legislature was, by reason of Art. IV, Section 19, barred from authorizing 
sports betting that would place sports betting in a difficult predicament 
because, as discussed in Part VI of this paper, it would permit federal 
prosecution of sports betting establishments that conduct business with 
California customers. However, that concern is unwarranted because there is 
no real argument that the terms “lottery” or “Nevada and New Jersey type 
casinos” can be understood as applying to the business of sports betting as a 
standalone activity. 
Even if sports betting is not directly encompassed by Art. 4, §19 of the 
State Constitution, sports betting may be illegal based on California statutory 
law or California common law. 
Ⅳ.  THE CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 
California does not recognize the concept of “common law crime” as a 
basis for criminal prosecution. 89 In California, for conduct to be criminal, 
the conduct must be made criminal by statute.  
Criminal proscriptions of gambling are primarily set out in California 
Penal Code Sections 330 through 337. Several of these provisions would 
likely be cited as sufficient to bar sports betting in California. However, it is 
unclear whether, separately or in the aggregate, these provisions are 
sufficient to do so when the actual placement of the bet occurs outside the 
State. As will be discussed throughout this portion of the paper, it is 
important to distinguish between the customer who makes the bets and the 
person (or entity) that accept the bets in determining whether a criminal act 
has occurred. It is the central theme of this paper that there is a significant 
difference under California law between a sport bet made and placed in 
California, and a sports bet made outside California in a jurisdiction where 
sports betting is legal. This distinction can be illustrated through two 
examples. 
Example 1: Customer goes to Sam’s Sports Bar in Los Angeles, 
California. At the Bar, Customer places a bet on the Los Angeles Lakers 
against their opponent, the Los Angeles Clippers. The bet is placed with 
Debbie’s Sports Betting, which operates out of an office that is located in 
Sam’s Sports Bar. 
Example 2:  Customer goes to Sam’s Sports Bar in Los Angeles, 
California. While at the Bar, Customer texts Debbie’s Sports Betting 
(Debbie’s) which operates in Antigua, a jurisdiction in which sports betting 
is legal. Customer had previously deposited $1,000 with Debbie’s. Customer 
sends a text to Debbie’s instructing Debbie’s to place a bet on Customer’s 
 
 89. Cal. Penal Code § 6 expressly declares in relevant part: “No act or omission . . . is criminal or 
punishable, except as prescribed or authorized by this Code, … or by some ordinance, municipal, county, 
or township regulation. . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 6. See also Keeler v. Superior Court 2 Cal. 3d 619 (1970).  
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behalf on the Los Angeles Lakers against their opponent the Los Angeles 
Clippers. Debbie’s does so in Antigua by debiting Customer’s account in the 
amount of the bet. Debbie’s then sends a text to Customer confirming the 
bet. 
There is no question that Example 1 constitutes a crime under California 
law.90 Whether Example 2 constitutes a crime under California law is less 
clear. This format is not new; most online gambling operations use it. When 
prosecuted as a violation of federal law, the format has not been successful 
in avoiding a finding of criminal conduct, but the cases have all involved a 
touching of a jurisdiction that treats the conduct as unlawful. 91 As will be 
discussed in this section, the critical issues are (1) the nature of the 
“touching” and (2) whether the “touching” permits the application of a 
jurisdiction’s (here California) laws to the transaction. 
California Penal Code Section 337a(a)6 specifically addresses 
“bookmaking” with respect to sporting events. The subsections focus on the 
person taking the bet, i.e., the “bookmaker,” and go into extensive detail to 
identify and criminalize the business of bookmaking.92 In Example 1, 
Debbie’s is taking bets on sporting events in California. Debbie’s is engaging 
in conduct specifically criminalized by statute and can be prosecuted 
criminally for that conduct. In Example 2, however, Debbie’s is not 
operating in California; rather, Debbie’s is operating in Antigua, where 
sports betting is legal. Whether a criminal act occurred in Example 2, thus, 
turns on whether (1) Customer’s actions subject Customer to criminal 
liability in California, or (2) whether Customer’s actions subject Debbie’s to 
criminal liability in California. 
A. CUSTOMER’S CONDUCT 
Customer is not a bookmaker. The only part of California Penal Code 
Section 337a that could possibly apply to Customer is Section 337a(a)6, 
which specifically subjects to criminal prosecution “every person who. . . 
[l]ays, makes, offers or accept any bet…” In Example 2, does Customer’s 
action fall within the above prohibition? The two relevant terms are “makes” 
and “offers.” Does Customer “make” or “offer” a bet or is Customer simply 
instructing Debbie’s how to make a bet, but the bet is actually made (and 
offered) in Antigua where Debbie’s consummates the transaction. If the bet 
is not actually “made” or “offered” in California, the argument may be made 
 
 90. Cal. Penal Code § 337a(a)(2) states that maintaining a place where bookmaking occurs is a 
crime; Cal. Penal Code § 337a(a)(3) states that engaging in bookmaking by receiving or transferring bets 
on sporting events is a crime; Cal. Penal Code § 337a(a)6 states that engaging in making or placing bets 
on sports events is a crime.  
 91. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001) (bookmaking business set up in 
Antigua, but bets initiated in New York where conduct was unlawful); see also, (Fed. Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1084(a). See also Santoro v. State, 959 So.2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (bookmaking business set 
up in Costa Rica, but bets made and placed in Florida where conduct was unlawful). This issue is 
discussed in greater detail in Part Ⅵ of this paper. 
 92. Cal. Penal Code § 337(a). 
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that Example 2 does not literally fall within Section 337a(a)6 insofar as 
Customer is concerned.93 This illustrates a problem common to many 
gambling statutes; the statutes were enacted long before the modern era of 
interstate communication, the internet, and electronic transactions. When 
Section 337a(a)6 was enacted, making a bet required physical presence or 
the physical embodiment of a transaction. A person would meet with or call 
a bookmaker, the transaction had a physical presence, and bets were paid in 
cash or cash equivalents. That world is far distant from the world of Example 
2, and interpreting Section 337a(a)(6) to apply to Example 2 requires some 
legal legerdemain. When an instruction to engage in a transaction is made 
online, and all physical actions relevant to the transaction occur outside the 
jurisdiction, does the transaction sufficiently “touch” the jurisdiction (here 
California) to permit the jurisdiction to apply its law to the matter? 
It may be argued that reading the words “make” and “offer” in the above 
manner is a somewhat strained interpretation of the terms “make” or “offer.” 
Customer’s text initiated the transaction, and Debbie’s is exercising no 
independent judgment here other than deciding whether to accept the wager. 
Or to look at the same transaction somewhat differently, would it constitute 
a violation of Section 337a(a)(6), i.e., would Customer be “making” or 
“offering” a wager if Customer mailed instructions to a friend in Antigua to 
place the bet for him (Customer) in Antigua? Do the concepts “made” or 
“offered” extend to transactions that can be construed as “requests to make” 
or “requests to offer”?94 Criminal statutes must be clear and distinct in 
identifying what is criminal. On the one hand, it may be argued that 
Customer has not “made” or “offered” a wager because a request is 
analytically precedent to the act (making or offering) itself. On the other 
hand, one could argue that Customer’s conduct would satisfy either term. 
Customer is instructing Debbie’s to take the amount of the bet out of his 
account and use those funds to bet on the Los Angeles Lakers. Although this 
message is framed as an instruction, the operative effect of the message could 
be understood as the making of a bet or an offer to make a bet. This is how 
Debbie’s understands the message as evidence by Debbie’s actions in 
Example 2. It is unlikely that a court would treat Customer’s instruction as 
something other than an offer to make a bet. 
It is somewhat anomalous that a statute would seek to criminalize the 
conduct of customers who engage with bookmakers. There are no reported 
cases of Section 337a(a)(6) being applied to customers, nor is there any 
legislative history evidencing an intent that Section 337a(a)(6) was to be 
applied to customers. Likely, the purpose of Section 337a(a)(6) was not to 
 
 93. No other subparagraph applies directly to customer’s engagement with Debbie’s business model 
as set out in Example 2.  
 94. Structuring commercial relationships in this manner is common when the provider of the service 
wants to maintain control over the terms of the transaction. For example, life insurance companies often 
use applications for insurance as a mechanism to allow the insurer to control the terms of the offer. See 
Robert E. Keeton, Alan I. Widiss, James M. Fischer, INSURANCE LAW, § 2.1(c)(1), (2d ed. 2016).  
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criminalize the conduct of customers who make bets but to criminalize the 
conduct of bookmakers who make bets. Bookmakers make bets in two ways.  
Bookmakers do not usually make money by placing bets themselves but 
by charging a fee on their customers’ bets. This fee is known as “virgorish,” 
or “vig.” Ideally, the bookmaker will be able to balance bets so that after the 
transaction fee is taken, the remaining money in the betting pool is sufficient 
so that losers pay off winners. The bookmaker does this by offering odds on 
the betting transaction that will induce an equal amount to be bet on both 
sides of the proposition and structuring payouts to guarantee a profit. 
Sometimes, however, the bookmaker finds a betting imbalance; too much 
money has been bet on one side of the proposition. For the bookmaker, this 
creates the risk of a large win or a large loss, rather than a guaranteed profit. 
To address the problem, the bookmakers use a technique known as “laying 
off,” where they make bets with other bookmakers to balance the books.95 
The bookmaker is essentially purchasing insurance to prevent variance 
between the risk of a large win or a large loss. This reduces the guaranteed 
profit but avoids the variance created by the customers’ betting imbalance. 
Bookmakers utilizing “laying off” techniques is clearly illegal96 and a 
violation of Section 337a.97 
The second way bookmakers make bets is by cheating. Sometimes a 
bookmaker will receive information on the outcome of a proposition, for 
example, a horse race, before other bookmakers. An unscrupulous 
bookmaker can use this information to make a bet with another less informed 
bookmaker to make a guaranteed profit. This tactic is known as past-posting 
and is also criminalized by Section 337a.98 
As is fairly evident, neither of these applications involve customers, and 
it is likely that the use of the term “make” in Section 337a was designed to 
interdict these activities rather than make criminals of ordinary citizens who 
made a sports bet.  
There is, however, a related issue involving the application of Section 
337a(a)6: Even if Customer’s conduct falls within Section 337a(a)6, there 
are no reported prosecutions of customers who make bets with bookmakers. 
It appears to be the practice of at least some District Attorney Offices in 
California that customers of bookmakers will not be prosecuted even though 
the customer’s actions violate Sections 337a(a)6.99 NFL football and NCAA 
Basketball Tournament betting pools are common in California. Such bets 
 
 95. See United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing “lay off” bookmaking).  
 96. See Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 736, 744 (1961). 
 97. See People v. Oreck, 74 Cal. App. 2d 215, 220 (1946). 
 98. See Epstein v. California Horse Racing Bd., 222 Cal. App. 2d 831, 842 (1963) (holding that 
“post-posting” is a criminal violation of Cal. Penal Code Pen. Code § 337(a)(a)(6). 
 99. See People v. Garner, 72 Cal. App. 3d 214, 216-18 (1977) (undisputed evidence was that the Los 
Angeles Police Department and the district attorney’s office have a policy neither to arrest not to 
prosecute betters while they do arrest and prosecute bookmakers). In Garner, the defendant, who was 
charged with being a bookmaker, argued that this policy constituted “selective enforcement,” but the 
court rejected the contention. Id. 
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involve contributions by numerous individuals to a fund that is distributed to 
the winners, i.e., those who select winners. This betting format clearly falls 
under California Penal Code Section 337a as a pooling of funds; yet, no 
California participant, to this author’s knowledge, has ever been charged 
with a violation of Penal Code Section 337a.100 One would not be surprised 
if such “office pools” are conducted within the Governor’s and Attorney 
General’s offices. Everyone considers such conduct harmless and non-
criminal. Should it matter that such conduct technically constitutes a 
violation of the letter of Penal code Section 337a and also subjects 
participants to criminal prosecution? What is the rationale for treating 
conduct as criminal when the law is not enforced, and the conduct is not just 
tolerated but widespread?101 
Consistent, long-term non-enforcement of criminal statues may give 
rise to a legitimate expectation of continued non-enforcement. This is more 
commonly known as “desuetude,”102 and while desuetude has been 
characterized as an “obscure” doctrine, it is based on the fundamental values 
of fair notice and reliance. That said, whether a court would accept the 
principle of desuetude to bar a criminal prosecution is unclear at best. In 
United States v. Morrison,103 the court considered the principle of desuetude, 
but ultimately concluded that on the merits that it should not be applied.104 
Morrison involved the non-enforcement of laws regarding taxation of sales 
of cigarettes, the violation of which would result in criminal sanction. The 
sales occurred on Native American reservations without the payment of 
taxes. The court identified several factors that would influence whether 
desuetude should be recognized: (1) What are the reasons for non-
enforcement; (2) Have the reasons for the statute’s enactment ceased to exist; 
and (3) Is non-enforcement consistent with a shift in public attitudes 
regarding whether the conduct should be criminalized.105 The Morrison court 
noted that the failure to enforce the State’s taxing authority over sales of 
cigarettes on Native American reservations was not due to a change in the 
reasons for the enactment of the statute or due to neglect. The court noted 
that reservation sales of cigarettes was a problem the State sought to address, 
but Native Americans thwarted its efforts. Moreover, the court said there was 
no evidence of a shift in public attitudes to the payment of taxes on cigarette 
sales or approval of the tactic undertaken by Native Americans to thwart the 
payment of taxes.106 
 
 100. Cal. Penal Code § 337(a).  
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
 102. See Desuetude, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2209 (2006). “Desuetude” is based on the principle that 
enforcement of the law is as much a part of the law and the law’s text. Consistent, long-term non-
enforcement of law is thus seen as effectively the repeal of the law. Id. at 2210. 
 103. United States v. Morrison, 596 F.Supp.2d 661 (E.D.N.Y 2009). 
 104. Id. at 702. 
 105. Id. at 702-3. 
 106. Id. 
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Admittedly, desuetude is not a principle that courts have embraced, but 
even when it is rejected, as in Morrison, the court often finds that the case 
for desuetude has not really been made. This is likely due to the norms and 
principles that underlie desuetude – fair notice and justified reliance, both of 
which are connected to the reality that enforcement is a basic aspect of a 
law’s standing and acceptance in society. A law that is ignored and shunned 
can hardly make the same claim for public recognition and acceptance as an 
enforced law. Enforcement bespeaks visibility and serves notice that 
violations will be prosecuted. So, can the claim be made that if desuetude 
was recognized, it would apply to customers who make bets with bookies? 
The topic of non-enforced law has drawn some attention, both directly 
and indirectly. Indirectly, attention has been on the enforceability of laws, 
such as fornication and sodomy, that criminalize private, consensual 
conduct, which is rarely, if ever, enforced today; however, the brooding 
omnipresence of the criminal statute chills and discourages intimate 
associations because of the “fear” of criminal prosecution.107 Much of the 
focus here is on whether individuals and groups have standing to challenge 
the legality and enforceability of these statutes that hang like a sword of 
Damocles over those who wish to engage in the activity the statute literally 
prohibits. In other words, is the “threat” of prosecution sufficient to 
constitute the particularized, concrete injury in fact that is necessary to 
permit judicial consideration of the issue?108 Courts are divided on the issue, 
but many have declined to find standing in this context, concluding that the 
“threat” is too ephemeral and speculative to justify judicial intervention.109 
A related theme is whether non-enforcement of a criminal statute 
constitutes implicit official acknowledgment that the statute criminalizes 
protected activity. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas,110 the Court noted that 
a number of states that criminalized sodomy “engage[d] in a pattern of non-
enforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private” that 
“evidenced an ‘emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons [regarding private sexual conduct].’”111 
 
 107. See Christopher R. Leslie, Standing in the Way of Equality: How States Use Standing Doctrine 
to Insulate Sodomy Laws from Constitutional Attack, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 29; See also Hillary Green, 
Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169 (1997). 
 108. Leslie, supra note 107; Jason R. LaFond, Injury-In-Fact, Justice-In-Fiction: Toward a More 
Realistic Definition of “Injury” in the Context of Unenforced Criminal Law, 13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 1 
(2009).  
 109. See, e.g., Berg v. State, 100 P.3d 261 (Utah 2004) (stating that fear of prosecution does not create 
standing necessary to challenge statutes criminalizing sodomy and fornication); cf. Collier v. Fox, Not 
Reported in Fed. Supp. (2018), 2018 WL 1247411 (D. Mt. 2018) (holding that a couple lacked standing 
to raise substantive due process challenge to state statute criminalizing bigamy because there was no 
genuine threat of prosecution for polygamous relationships).  
 110. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding substantive due process challenge to Texas 
statute that criminalized sodomy between consenting, adult homosexuals). 
 111. Id. at 572. 
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Admittedly, neither of the above themes directly supports a claim that 
non-enforcement of a criminal law negates or nullifies the enforceability of 
that law. Both themes, however, provide support for the claim that non-
enforcement, or more precisely a “pattern of non-enforcement,” is a factor 
that should be seriously considered when determining whether a non-
enforced criminal statute can be resurrected from the dead. Denying persons 
or groups seeking to challenge a dormant, non-enforced criminal statute and 
then giving the government free rein to prosecute persons for violating the 
same law raises substantial questions of fundamental fairness. Even if the 
activity that the state “literally” criminalizes does not involve intimate, 
private behavior, surely persons have a reasonable expectation that a pattern 
of official non-enforcement will continue, at least until the government 
announces a change in practice that will alert persons that the activity will 
no longer be tolerated. 
If one looks directly at the topic of non-enforced law, one finds the 
courts have been divided on whether sustained, prolonged non-enforcement 
creates a legally enforceable bar to enforcement. Many courts have 
concluded that non-enforcement does not result in the statute’s nullification 
or bar enforcement.112 However, a few courts have refused to allow 
prosecution of criminal statutes after a prolonged period of non-enforcement. 
In State v. Vadnais,113 the defendant was criminally prosecuted for violating 
a local ordinance that restricted dwelling in or parking a mobile home trailer 
except in a licensed facility. Defendant argued that he was the victim because 
the ordinance was enforced against him and not others who had parked 
residential trailers in violation of the ordinance. The court agreed and stated: 
A conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement, based on a 
rational exercise of police or prosecutorial discretion or a mere laxity in 
enforcement, does not itself establish a constitutional violation. However, 
an intentional or deliberate decision by public officials, acting as agents of 
the state, not to enforce penal regulations against a class of violators 
expressly included within the terms of such penal regulation does, in our 
view, under the principle of Yick Wo, constitute a denial of the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law.114 
Similarly, in Committee of Legal Ethics v. Printz,115 the defendant, an 
attorney, threatened to report a third party’s misbehavior to law enforcement 
unless the third party made restitution.116 For this conduct, defendant was 
 
 112. See, e.g., U.S. v. American Elec. Power Service Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806-07 (2003) 
(stating that there is no right to have a law go unenforced against you). 
 113. State v. Vadnais, 202 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1972). 
 114. Id. at 659. 
 115. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 187 W. Va. 182, 183-84 (1992) (stating 
that the third party had embezzled funds from defendant’s client). 
 116. Id. at 185 (citing W. Va. Code, 61–5–19 (1923)). The statute provided: 
“If any person, knowing of the commission of an offense, take any money, or reward, or an 
engagement therefor upon an agreement or undertaking, expressed or implied, to compound or 
conceal such offense, or not to prosecute therefor, or not to give evidence thereof, he shall, if 
such offense be a felony, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, be confined to jail 
Winter 2021               IS ONLINE SPORT BETTING ILLEGAL IN CALIFORNIA? 85 
disciplined by the West Virginia bar. The West Virginia Supreme Court 
reviewed the discipline charge. Critical to the court’s decision was whether 
the defendant’s threat was a legitimate or illegitimate negotiation tactic. A 
West Virginia statute made criminal the offering not to prosecute a crime in 
exchange for the return of funds lost due to the crime, which is what the 
defendant did. 
Similar to the Vadnais court, the Printz court noted that prosecution 
under a long dormant criminal statute raises issues of the basic fairness of 
selective prosecution: “a law prohibiting some act that has not given rise to 
a real prosecution in 20 years is unfair to the one person selectively 
prosecuted under it.”117 
Of course, as both Vadnais and Printz noted, some selectivity is 
inherent in law enforcement based on enforcement priorities and available 
resources. Selectivity becomes a problem, however, when a criminal statute 
is not enforced for a lengthy period of time, thus, creating a reasonable belief 
that the statute has become superannuated.118 In Printz, the court identified 
several factors that would support a finding that non-enforcement would be 
a viable defense to a newly developed interest on the part of prosecutors to 
enforce a moribund criminal statute. First, did the statute prohibit conduct 
that was malum per se (conduct that is inherently morally wrong, such as 
larceny) or conduct that was malum prohibitum (conduct that is wrong only 
because it is legally proscribed, such as Sunday Closing laws)? Conduct that 
is malum per se remains proscribed even during periods of prolonged non-
enforcement but conduct that is only malum prohibitum may lose its 
prohibited character as a result of prolonged non-enforcement. 
Second, has there been open, notorious violations of the law during the 
period of non-enforcement? A law that successfully proscribes conduct does 
not become a victim of its own success. On the other hand, a law that is 
openly violated, without sanction, can create a reasonable, enforceable 
expectation that violations of the law on the book will not be enforced. As 
one court noted: “An unenforced law is little better that a nullity.”119 
Third, has there been an open, conspicuous policy of non-enforcement 
of the criminal statute? Here again, the emphasis is on reasonable 
expectations. Open, conspicuous non-enforcement provides support to the 
expectation that violations will not be prosecuted. 
How do these factors apply to enforcement of Penal Code Section 
337a(a)(6) to the customers of bookmakers? First, is sports betting (or 
gambling in general) malum per se? Although there are diverse groups in the 
 
not more than one year and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars; and if such offense be 
not a felony, unless it be punishable merely by a forfeiture to him, he may be confined in jail 
not more than six months, and shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.”  
 117. Id. at 186. 
 118. Cf. Wright v. Crane, 13 Serg. & Rawle 220, 228 (Pa. 1825) (“Total disuse of any civil institution 
for ages past may afford just and rational objections against disrespected and superannuated 
ordinances.”).  
 119. Paul v. Wadler’s Cash & Carry, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr 18 (Ct. App. 1964). 
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United States that consider gambling to be morally wrong, that view is 
different, if not impossible, to square with the general public’s attitudes 
towards gambling today. In most American jurisdictions, including 
California, gambling is not just tolerated, it is encouraged, albeit as a 
regulated industry. The United States Supreme Court recently observed that 
gambling does not violate California public policy.120 
Second, is sports betting open and notorious in California? One only 
needs to follow news and sports media to identify how pervasive sports 
betting is in California, although on a private level that resists verification. 
California news and sports media regularly report betting odds on college 
and professional games. That reporting suggests interest in sports betting 
information and likely usage of that information in private wagering. It has 
been estimated that the underground sports betting market in the United 
States is large. A report by the United States National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission estimated that illegal sports betting in the United States 
ranged from $80 billion to $380 billion.121 Those are 1999 dollars and would 
be higher today. The America Gaming Association’s estimates that the 
illegal sports betting market in the United States is approximately $150 
billion.122 Both of these estimates evidence that sports betting in the United 
States is widespread and known to exist. While I do not have specific figures 
for California, if one simply extrapolates based on California’s population, 
which is approximately 10% of the United States population, that equates to 
approximately $8 billion to $38 billion (in 1999 dollars), using the National 
Impact Study estimate, or $15 billion, using the American Gaming 
Association estimate. 
Lastly, has there been conspicuous non-enforcement of the criminal 
statute? There have been no reported decisions of prosecutions for 
bookmaking under Section 337a(a)(6). Prosecutions against bookmakers are 
brought under other subsections of Penal Code Section 337a. There are no 
 
 120. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 201-11 (1987); see also 
Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sandri, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 646, 652-53 (Ct. App. 1964) (California does 
treat the enforcement of gambling debt as violative of public policy but California courts have not 
consistently extended this characterization to gambling in general); see infra Section Ⅴ of this paper. 
Indeed, the Sandri court noted the increased public tolerance and limited legalization of gambling in 
California, which is difficult to reconcile with a strong anti-gambling public policy. Id. at 653.  
 121. NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, 2-14 (June 1999), available 
at https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html. The report also noted: 
The popularity of sports wagering in most states, both legal and illegal, makes it a regulatory 
challenge. Legal sports wagering – especially the publication in the media of Law Vegas and 
offshore-generated point spreads – fuels a much larger amount of illegal sports wagering. 
Although illegal in 48 states, office betting is flourishing. This type of informal or small-scale 
betting, which is often considered innocuous and not worth prosecuting from a law 
enforcement standpoint, is often ignored and goes largely unregulated.  
Id. at 3-9.  
 122. See Press Release, American Gaming Association,  97% of Expected $10 Billion Wagered on 
March Madness to be bet Illegally (Mar. 12, 2018), available at 
https://www.americangaming.org/new/97-of-expected-10-billion-wagered-on-march-madness-to-be-
bet-illegally/. 
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reported decisions of a prosecution against a customer under any part of 
Section 337a, much less Section 337a(a)(6). Significantly, as previously 
noted, the District Attorney of Los Angeles, California’s largest county, 
represented to the court that it was the policy of that office not to prosecute 
customers. 
In summary, if a court was disposed to follow Vadnais and Printz, a 
very credible case can be made that Penal Code Section 337a(a)(6) cannot 
be applied to customers of bookmakers, at least until state and local officials 
state an intention to do so and follow through with that intention. 
Courts have noted that public attitudes toward gambling have evolved 
significantly over the last several decades. A consumer-oriented economy 
and society has created a culture in which gambling is seen as both 
acceptable and desirable. The reluctance to treat “social gambling” as a crime 
surely reflects the view that a person not in the business of gambling should 
not be criminally prosecuted for activities that a state actively encourages in 
other gambling contexts, e.g., California State Lottery.123 Even if one does 
not accept the full argument that consistent, long-term non-enforcement of 
criminal statutes results in the effective nullification of the statute, it is fair 
that a State should be held to the position it has effectively taken until it 
announces the intent to no longer engage in non-enforcement. This is close 
to saying that the doctrine of estoppel should be applied here. Having 
established, by policy or simple inaction, a visible and long-standing practice 
of non-enforcement of sports betting laws against customers who bet, 
fundamental fairness requires that those who bet be forewarned that 
henceforth non-enforcement will not be the norm. More importantly, such a 
pronouncement should be backed-up with effective action, else the statement 
will be rightfully perceived as lacking substance and credibility.  
California recognizes that equitable estoppel may be asserted against 
the government. In Long Beach v. Manse,124 the court observed that an 
equitable estoppel may be applied against the government “in those 
exceptional cases where justice and right require.”125 It is, of course, always 
difficult to define what is an exceptional case. California courts have refused 
to apply an estoppel against the government when to do so would be 
injurious to the policy of protecting the public. For example, in Pittsburg 
 
 123. Limiting criminal culpability to persons engaged in the business of gambling is common. See, 
e.g., Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (“Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or 
wagering….”); The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (defining “unlawful activity” as including “any 
business enterprise involving gambling”). California does not, however, require that a bookmaker be in 
the “business” of bookmaking. See Cal. Pen. Code § 337a(e) (“This section shall apply not only to persons 
who may commit any of the acts designated in subdivisions 1 to 6 inclusive of this section, as a business 
or occupation, but shall also apply to every person or persons who may do in a single instance any one of 
the acts specified in said subdivisions 1 to 6 inclusive.”).  
 124. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423 (1970). 
 125. Id. at 451. 
88 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 18:1 
Unified School Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence126 the court 
refused to apply an equitable estoppel when to do so would place high school 
students at risk by preventing dismissal of a teacher. There are no cases that 
directly raise the issue of estoppel in the context of non-enforcement of a 
gambling statute, but it is difficult to identify how the public would be 
harmed if an estoppel were to be recognized in the context of sports betting 
by customers. It is irrefutable that Californians gamble and particularly 
engage in sports betting. If they are being harmed by the activity, the 
government has not acted on that harm since the ban on bookmaking was 
enacted in 1909 and the general prohibitions on gambling were first enacted 
in 1872. One would think if the public was being harmed, the government 
would have noticed it by now and acted accordingly.  
That said, many courts have rejected the argument of lax or non-existent 
prosecution as a defense against the enforcement of criminal law.127 On the 
other hand, in Raley v. Ohio128 and Cox v. Louisiana,129 defendants were 
allowed to challenge a prosecution on the ground that their conduct had been 
induced by reliance on advice given by state officials. Although the defense 
was framed as “entrapment,” the force of the entrapment defense was 
“detrimental reliance,” and it is not uncommon to refer to this as “entrapment 
by estoppel.”130  
Estoppel usually involves affirmative conduct, and it is sometimes said 
that mere silence cannot raise an estoppel,131 but that is incorrect. When from 
all the facts and circumstances it appears that silence did in fact induce 
prejudicial reliance and this was known to the party to be estopped, but 
nothing was done, an estoppel may arise.132 This is known as “misleading 
silence.” For example, when a patent owner objects to another party’s actions 
 
 126. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist. v. Commn. On Prof. Competence, 194 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Ct. App. 
1983).  
 127. See, e.g., State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 374 – 376 (Wash. 2002) (abrogated on other grounds); 
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621 (Wash. 2018); State v. Drown, 797 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Wis. App. 2011). 
 128. Raley v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959) (“We hold that in circumstances of these 
cases, the judgments of the Ohio Supreme Court affirming the convictions violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and must be reversed…. After the Commission, speaking for the 
State, acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgment would be to sanction an indefensible 
sort of entrapment by the State—convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly 
told him was available to him.”); the circumstances of the cases were that the defendants had invoked the 
privilege against self-incrimination after being informed they had the right to remain silent, but were then 
convicted of criminal contempt for not answering the questions posed. 
 129. Cox v. State of La., 379 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1965) (In Cox the defendant was told by the Chief of 
Police that he (Cox) could lead a large contingent of demonstrators to a site near a courthouse. Cox was 
arrested and convicted of violating a Louisiana statute that barred “picketing” near a courthouse. The 
Court reversed the holding that Cox was activity misled to his detriment by the Chief of Police.). 
 130. See Sean Connelly, Bad Advice: The Entrapment By Estoppel Doctrine in Criminal Law, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 627 (1994). 
 131. Hottel Corp. v. Seaman Corp., 833 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Waldrip v. Olympia Oyster 
Co., 244 P.2d 273, 277 (Wash. 1952).  
 132. People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 196 P.2d 570, 580-81 (Cal. 1948) (“An estoppel may arise from 
silence but only when there is a duty to speak, and where the party upon whom such duty rests has an 
opportunity to speak and knowing that circumstances require him to speak, remains silent”). 
Winter 2021               IS ONLINE SPORT BETTING ILLEGAL IN CALIFORNIA? 89 
as constituting a possible infringement and then remains silent in the face of 
continuing activity by the second party before seeking relief, courts have 
deemed the patent owner’s silence to be misleading.133 Applying this 
principle to Penal Code Section 337a(a)6, one could argue that having once 
objected to the conduct of customer betting, by enacting a statute, the 
government has since remained silent, by never enforcing that statute, and 
thereby induced in the general public the reasonable belief that betting is not 
criminal insofar as the customer is concerned.  
B. DEBBIE’S CONDUCT 
Even if in Example 2, Customer’s conduct is not deemed criminal, does 
Debbie’s actions in accepting the bet and notifying Customer that the bet has 
been placed subject Debbie’s to prosecution in California? As noted 
previously, functionally Debbie’s has “accepted” a bet, which is clearly 
made criminal by California Penal Code Section 337a(a)(6), and other 
subparts of Subsection 337a. Can those provisions be asserted against 
Debbie’s, which operates out of Antigua and has no physical presence in 
California? 
Does Debbie’s out-of-state activities permit criminal prosecution by 
California? As a federal constitutional matter, the answer is “yes.” In 
Strassheim v. Daily,134 the Supreme Court held that states could criminally 
prosecute conduct that occurred outside the state when the out-of-state 
conduct was intended to produce and did produce detrimental effects within 
the state.135 Debbie’s conduct would on the surface appear to satisfy this test. 
Debbie’s is deliberately accepting bets from Customer who is in California, 
which makes accepting bets a crime. And, while it is well-settled that 
“minimum contacts” is the rule for personal jurisdiction in civil cases, in 
criminal cases the defendant’s intent is the central focus.136 The issue is 
whether there is a “nexus” between the defendant’s deliberate conduct and 
the forum,137 such that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over the 
defendant’s out-of-state actions is fundamentally fair and not arbitrary.138 
Here, Debbie’s would be hard-pressed to refute that it had that intent given 
that it engaged in a transaction and maintained a relationship with Customer, 
who Debbie’s knew or should have known was a California resident at all 
relevant times.139 
 
 133. Meyers v. Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing cases but finding 
rule not applicable based on the record); see Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS  L. 
REV. 1 (1995) (discussing when silence may create reasonable expectation of assent or reliance).  
 134. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). 
 135. Id. at 285. 
 136. State v. Amorosa, 975 P.2d 505, 508 (Utah App. 1999).  
 137. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 138. United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 139. “Geolocation” enables an online service provider to find and determine the exact location of a 
computer or networking device that is connected to the provider. “Geolocation” is used by online 
gambling services to ensure that services are only provided in jurisdictions where the gambling site is 
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A state’s authority to subject out-of-state conduct to criminal 
prosecution in the state is not, however, self-executing. The state must have 
a law permitting it to subject out-of-state conduct to its criminal 
jurisdiction.140 Many states, including California, have such statutes, but 
those statutes were not designed with the internet in mind. 
California Penal Code Section 778 provides: 
 
When the commission of a public offense, commenced without the State, 
is consummated within its boundaries by a defendant, himself outside the 
State, through the intervention of an innocent or guilty agent or any other 
means proceeding directly from said defendant, he is liable to punishment 
therefor in this State in an competent court within the jurisdiction territory 
in which the offense is consummated.141 
 
Section 778 dates from 1872142 when “consummated” had a tangible, 
physical connotation. In the internet era, what does “consummated” mean in 
the context of Example 2?143 In the physical world, the answers are easy. 
Mailing a forged or counterfeit check from another state to a California bank 
for negotiation satisfies the “consummated in California” requirement.144 
Embezzling funds from a person in California, even though the embezzler is 
in another state also satisfies the “consummated in California” 
requirement.145 In both cases, physical acts occurred in California – checks 
were negotiated or accounts were depleted; thus, the detrimental effects were 
physically connected to California. In Example 2, however, the only physical 
acts that occur in California are the sending of money to Debbie’s “on 
account” and the transmission of information relating to the making of a bet. 
Both of these actions precede the actual consummation of the transaction, 
which occurs outside California. It is difficult to understand pre-transaction 
 
licensed. See James Warmington, How Does Sportsbook Geolocation Work in New Jersey?, SPORTS 
BETTING (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.gambling.com/us/online-betting/knowledge/how-does-
sportsbook-geolocation-work-in-new-jersey-2115100 (discussing use of Geolocation by online gambling 
sites to insure compliance with licensing requirements that sites provide services only to users within 
jurisdictions that authorize gambling on the site); Steve Ruddock, The Backbone of Legal Online 
Gambling in the US, Part 1: Geolocation, BETTING USA (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://www.bettingusa.com/geolocation-interview-geocomply/ (discussing need for online gambling 
sites to use Geolocation to insure regulatory compliance). 
 140. This is particularly true in California, which, as noted previously, has adopted the principle that 
conduct cannot be prosecuted as criminal unless it has been made criminal by statute; See supra note 89 
and accompanying text; See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 explanatory note (Am. L. Inst., Proposed 
Official Draft 1962) (“[A] state has jurisdiction when . . . conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt 
or conspiracy within the state or is prohibited by a statute of the state specifically directed at such out-of-
state conduct.”). 
 141. Cal. Penal Code § 778 (1872). 
 142. Id. credits.  
 143. Jean-Bapiste Maillart, The Limits of Subjective Territorial Jurisdiction in the Context of 
Cybercrime, 19 ERA F. 375 (2019) (Ger.), https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-018-0527-2 (questioning the 
utility of territorial concepts when addressing jurisdiction questions in the digital era). 
 144. People v. Sansom, 173 P. 1107, 1108-09 (Cal. App. 1918). 
 145. Ex Parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 108, 114 (1866). 
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activity as “consummation.” “Consummation” is an action-effect 
relationship, with the event being “consummated” when the effect is 
realized, e.g., the negotiation of the forged check or the depletion of funds 
through embezzlement.146 In Example 2, the transaction is not structured in 
a manner that it can be said that the prohibited act – bookmaking by the 
making of a bet– was consummated within California.  
In Hageseth v. Superior Court,147 the court addressed the application of 
Section 778 “consummated in California” requirement to criminal activity 
involving the internet. The activity involved the purchase through the 
internet of prescription medications. The request for the medication was 
made on the internet from within California.148 The request was reviewed 
and approved in another state by a non-licensed person. The person in 
California paid for the medication by credit card in California. Subsequently, 
the recipient of the medication overdosed and committed suicide. The 
defendant was charged with practicing medicine in California without a 
license. The court held the “consummation in California” requirement was 
met.149 The court noted that under the applicable statute (Business & 
Professions Code §2052) there was no requirement that an injury or harm be 
caused; all that was required was that the defendant hold oneself out as 
practicing any method of treating the sick or afflicted in California. 
Defendant clearly did this by prescribing and providing medications to a 
person in California.150 Defendant deliberately engaged in conduct that had 
an effect in California – the “holding oneself out as” – and, thus, was 
properly subject to California criminal jurisdiction. California does not, 
however, criminalize “holding oneself out as a bookmaker”; California 
criminalizes the making, offering and accepting of bets.151  
In Hageseth, there was a direct connection between the defendant’s out-
of-state actions and the effect or consequence of those actions in California. 
Although the transaction occurred on the internet, the key was not the mode 
of communication but the defendant’s intent to hold himself out in California 
as a licensed Physician – and that holding out occurred in California where 
it was received by the recipient of the information. While Hageseth is 
correct, it provides little assistance in the context set out in Example 2, where 
the transaction occurs out of state. If Hageseth had found jurisdiction when 
the recipient went to the defendant’s location to physically, or by a written 
or electronic communication, place the order with the defendant knowing the 
recipient would return to California with the medication, it would be 
 
 146. See Consummate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (4th ed. 1968) (defining “consummate” as 
“to finish by completing what was intended; bring or carry to the upmost point or degree; carry or bring 
to completion; finish, perfect”); NOAH WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 
UNABRIDGED 393 (2d ed. 1973) (defining “consummate” as “to sum up, finish”). 
 147. Hageseth v. Sup. Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr.3d 385, 390 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 148. Id. at 388. 
 149. Id. at 399. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Cal. Pen. Code § 337a(a)(6) (2010). 
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analogous to Example 2. However,  the court in Hageseth did not rely on the 
recipient’s actions to find “consummation.” When the transaction is 
structured so that the defendant conducts the business entirely out-of-state, 
but the recipient returns to California where the effect is realized, California 
courts have found that the conduct does not fall within Section 778.152 
Penal Section 778(a)153 addresses the converse problem, i.e., the 
defendant acts in California, but the crime occurs outside California. For the 
statute to apply, there must be some meaningful conduct connected to the 
criminal activity that occurs in California. For example, planning and 
preparing in California to commit the crime would be sufficient even though 
the crime is actually committed out of state.154 In one case, the court found 
Section 778(a) applied when the defendant, who had lost his license to 
practice medicine in California, advertised and met with patients in 
California, although the actual medical procedures took place out-of-state.155 
It is unclear whether Debbie’s connections with California, as set out in 
Example 2, compare with the activities courts have held satisfy Section 
778(a). Debbie’s likely advertises, but internet advertising is not focused to 
particular jurisdictions, like traditional advertising. Internet advertising tends 
to be search driven, i.e., the ad recipient finds the advertising through a 
search engine like Google. Debbie’s is likely aware that Customer is in 
California, but the only physical act that occurs in California is Customer’s 
communication to Debbie’s of Customer’s desire that a bet be made. 
Decisions applying Section 778(a) have all involved more direct connections 
to California than set out in Example 2. Whether less significant connections 
would suffice has not been determined. There is only one matter in which 
Section 778(a) was found not to be satisfied. In Fortner v. Superior Court,156 
the defendant was charged with domestic violence that occurred in another 
state. The court found no evidence that the defendant had engaged in conduct 
in California that was preparatory to the commission of the crime in another 
state. Example 2 falls somewhere between the “no connection” in Fortner 
and the more significant connections in the matters described above where 
courts have found that Section 778(a) was satisfied. So, Debbie’s is at some 
 
 152. Fortner v. Superior Ct., 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 133 (Ct. App. 2013) (stating that mere fact that 
activity conducted entirely in another state will have an “effect” in California when the person returns to 
California does not satisfy the “consummation” requirement of Cal. Pen. Code § 778(a); it must be 
intended by the defendant that the act will have an effect in California). 
 153. Cal. Pen. Code § 778(a) (2002) (“Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, does any 
act within this state in execution or part execution of that intent, which culminates in the commission of 
a crime, either within or without this state, the person is punishable for that crime in the same manner as 
if the crime had been committed entirely within this state.”). 
 154. People v. Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1084 (Cal. 1999); People v. Chapman, 139 Cal. Rptr. 808, 
810 (Ct. App. 1977). 
 155. See People v. Brown, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 879, 885-887 (Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that while 
illegal surgery performed by defendant on California resident occurred outside California in Mexico, 
prosecution of defendant was proper when defendant met with patient in California and returned to 
California with patient after illegal activity). 
 156. See supra note 152. 
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risk that its activities as set out in Example 2 would constitute a violation of 
Penal Code Section 778(a), but it is difficult to define with any precision the 
magnitude of the risk. 
Ⅴ.  CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW 
As noted previously, there are no common law crimes in California;157 
however, whether a transaction constitutes illegal common law gambling can 
have important criminal ramifications insofar as federal criminal statutes are 
concerned.158 The federal ramifications will be discussed shortly. Here, the 
paper addresses whether the transaction set out in Example 2 would be an 
illegal gambling contract under California common law. 
The primary common law proscription on gambling dates from 1710 
with Parliament’s adoption of the Statute of Anne.159 The Statute of Anne 
sought to interdict gambling by taking any and all profit out of the activity 
by declaring such transactions void. This was accomplished by allowing 
losers to recover their losses from winners, and by permitting suits to recover 
losses against winner by interested third persons. The first part of the Statute 
of Anne that declared gambling transactions void was, quickly construed as 
a general ban on the collection of gambling debts by winners against 
losers.160 Thus, as enacted and judicially construed, the Statute of Anne 
allowed gambling losers to recover their losses from gambling winners and 
prevented gambling winners from recovering their winnings from gambling 
losers. Gambling became a “no win” proposition for participants. Of course, 
gambling obligations might be honored between family and friends, but 
honor would not likely discourage a customer from suing a gambling 
establishment or stranger to recover losses or dissuade the customer from 
opposing a lawsuit to collect on a gambling debt the customer did not wish 
to pay.  These common law proscriptions were recognized early on by 
California courts as to the recovery of gambling debt.161 The recovery of 
gambling losses by losers against winners (as permitted by the Statute of 
Anne) has, however, not been recognized in California.162 California courts 
 
 157. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 158. Many federal statutes that address gambling require that the conduct be unlawful under state law. 
See, e.g., Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084. See infra Part VI. 
 159. An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14, § 1 
(Eng.); 7 MATTHEW BACON ET AL., A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 456 (Charles Edward Dodd 
eds., 7th ed. 1832). Prior to the Statute of Anne, English law had focused on preventing cheating while 
gambling and limiting judicial enforcement of large gambling debts. See Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, 
Revenues, and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C.L. REV. 11, 
17-18 (1992). 
 160. Blaxton v. Pye, 2 Wils. K.B. 309, 95 Eng. Rep. 828 (1766) (holding that gambling debts were 
not judicially cognizable). 
 161. Metro. Creditors Serv. v. Sandri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 646, 652-53 (Ct. App. 1993) (enforcement of 
gambling debt violates California public policy regardless of legality of gambling activity). 
 162. A number of states have incorporated the provisions of the Statute of Anne into their statutory 
law. See, e.g., W. Indies, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Nev., 214 P.2d 144, 152 (Nev. 1950) (discussing 
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failed to incorporate the Statute of Anne into California common law, as was 
the pattern in many other states.163 
In Bryant v. Mead,164 decided  shortly after California became a state, 
the court addressed a claim for recovery of a gambling debt. The defendant 
lost $4,000 playing faro, a card game. Plaintiff sought to recover the debt. 
The California Supreme Court refused to enforce the debt, relying 
extensively on English precedents that treated such obligations as 
unenforceable in a court of law or equity. At the time, California permitted 
the operation of licensed gambling houses. The plaintiff was apparently 
unlicensed, but the court commented that even if the plaintiff held a license, 
“such license should not be construed as conferring a right to sue for a 
gambling debt but as a protection solely against a criminal actions.”165 Two 
years later, in Carrier v. Brannan,166 the California Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the rule against judicial enforcement of gambling debts. The 
proscription on the recovery of gambling debt in courts of law or equity has 
been carried forward to modern times, and aside from one contrary 
decision,167 had been the settled law in California since statehood. 
The allowance of recovery of gambling losses from winners, authorized 
by the Statute of Anne, has not found judicial favor in California; rather, 
California courts have relied on statutory proscriptions on illegal conduct to 
refuse to permit the recovery of gambling losses by losers from winners. This 
is largely the result of the codification movement, which was accepted in 
California in 1872.168 While proscriptions on the enforcement of illegal 
bargains were added to the Civil Code, the Statute of Anne’s allowance of 
the recovery of gambling losses was not included. California courts have, 
until recently, been consistent in their refusal to permit any actions founded 
on a gambling transaction, even one based on equitable notions of 
reimbursement of losses. California courts have tended to see the 
unlawfulness of the gambling transaction as trumping all competing 
considerations. Legal and equitable doctrines, such as “in pari delicto,” 
 
incorporation of Statue of Anne into Nevada law and reconciling incorporation with the legalization of 
gambling in the state). 
 163. Rychlack, supra note 159, at 20 (“As the New World developed, the Statute of Anne, like other 
common law doctrines, became part of the law of every state”). 
 164. Bryant v. Mead, 1 Cal. 441 (1851). 
 165. Id. at 444. 
 166. Carrier v. Bowman, 3 Cal. 328 (1853). 
 167. Crockford’s Club Ltd. V. Si-Ahmed, 250 Cal. Rptr. 728, 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing 
English judgment based on a gambling debt; holding that acceptance of gambling in several forms in 
California made it no longer tenable to refuse to recognize a foreign judgment on the ground that 
enforcement of gambling debt violated California public policy). 
 168. The relationship between code and common law in California has been complicated from the 
outset. See Lewis Grossman, Codification and the California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1994). 
Compare Metro. Creditors Serv. v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 646, 648 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing the Statute of 
Anne as evidence of prohibition against gambling debts being “deeply rooted in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence”) with infra notes 170-178 and accompanying text (finding that the statute’s express 
authorization of lawsuits to recover gambling losses has been completely ignored when lawsuits of this 
type have been brought before California courts). 
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unclean hands, and illegality have been deemed superior to the norm 
expressed in the Statute of Anne that the profit should be taken out of 
gambling by permitting the recovery of gambling losses.169 
Recently, some California courts have been receptive to enforcing 
gambling contracts, although there remains contrary authority and one could 
not opine with confidence where California law currently stands on this 
matter. Two decisions illustrate the difference in position on this point at the 
current time. 
Kelly v. First Astri Corp.170 is an interesting case on its facts. Kelly 
involved a type of Class III gambling (banked games) before the California 
Constitution was amended to allow Tribal Casinos to offer Class III 
gambling under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.171 The controversy 
involved a casino on Sycuan Reservation land in Southern California. The 
Sycuan tribe contracted with defendant First Astri Corp. to manage the 
casino. The casino offered a banked “twenty one” game; however, the 
plaintiff Kelly, not defendant First Astri Corp., acted as the bank.172 Kelly 
claimed that First Astri Corp. negligently or intentionally allowed the 
placement of “marked” cards in the decks used to play the game Kelly 
banked. Kelly sought to recover his losses. The court concluded that Kelly 
was in violation of California Penal Code Section 330, which criminalizes 
the playing of the game of “twenty one” and all “banking games…played 
with cards…”173 
The court concluded that California public policy bars the recovery of 
gambling losses regardless of whether the losses arise out of lawful or 
unlawful gambling contracts or transactions.174 At the time Kelly incurred 
his losses at the Sycuan Tribal Casino, the game Kelly banked was likely 
illegal because the tribe had not entered into a compact with the State of 
California authorizing Class III gambling on reservation land.175 For that 
reason, the courts comments regarding whether Kelly could recover his 
losses if gambling were legal should be seen as dicta. However, the dicta is 
 
 169. See e.g., Wallace v. Opinham, 165 P.2d 709, 709-10 (Cal. 1946) (finding that if a party is cheated 
while illegally gambling, “law and equity” will not support the enforcement of “rights growing out of that 
illegal transaction” in the absence of a statute allowing recovery for gambling losses). Not all jurisdictions 
take such a strict approach. See also Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N.C. 485, 486 (holding that money taken fairly 
in an illegal gambling game cannot be recovered, but money taken through cheating in an illegal gambing 
game can). 
 170. Kelly v. First Astri Corpo., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 171. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act permits Native American tribes to provide gambling games 
on tribal lands. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701; See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 . Class III games are those that are generally 
offered in commercial casinos. See 25 C.F.R. § 502.4(a)(1). Class I games are traditional American 
gambling games. See 25 C.F.R. § 502.2. Class II games are non-banked gambling games (including bingo 
and poker). See 25 C.F.R. § 502.3. 
 172. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing use of Player-bank versus House-bank 
at California cardrooms). 
 173. See Kelly, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829. 
 174. Id. at 827-28. 
 175. See supra notes 44–51 and accompanying text (discussing the legalization of California Tribal 
Casinos). 
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consistent with prior judicial statements that treat the legal-illegal distinction 
as irrelevant. Simply put, by serving as the bank for the game of “Sycuan 
21,” Kelly was committing a crime and therefore was “in pari delicto”, i.e., 
as much responsible for his losses, if not more so, than defendant First Astri 
Corp, which operated the casino in which Kelly played.176 
The court also emphasized California’s strong public policy against 
recognition, recovery on, or enforcement of gambling contracts and that this 
policy may allow the refusal to recognize, recover on, or enforce gambling 
contracts, even transactions that are legal in the state where the gambling 
occurred.177 The court noted that under California law, the consideration for 
a contract must be lawful.178 Contracts and transactions in violation of 
criminal law are not lawful. However, even if the transaction is lawful, e.g., 
it does not violate Penal Code Section 330, a contract may still be unlawful 
if it is contrary to “‘an express provision of law,’ ‘the policy of express law, 
though not expressly prohibited,’ or ‘good morals.’”179 The court found, 
based on prior case law, that California consistently treated gambling 
contracts and transactions as contrary to good morals and unenforceable in 
all respects in California courts, including claims to recovery gambling 
losses.180 
The distinction between enforcement of a gambling contract and 
enforcement of gambling debt was recently addressed in Kyablue v. 
Watkins.181 The plaintiff Kyablue provided funds to defendant Watkins to be 
used for playing in lawful games of poker. Kyablue terminated the 
arrangement consistent with its terms and sought recovery from Watkins of 
funds Kyablue had advanced to Watkins but Watkins had not spent as of the 
date of termination. Watkins refused to return the funds, and Kyablue sued 
to recover. Watkins successfully demurred before the trial court to Kyablue’s 
complaint on the grounds that California public policy forbids enforcement 
of gambling-related contracts. The Court of Appeal reversed. 182 
The Kyablue court took a different approach from that in Kelly. First, 
the court noted that even if a contract is found to be illegal, California courts 
have permitted enforcement in compelling circumstances, particularly to 
avoid unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff.183  
 
 176. See Kelly, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828-29. The “crime” was Kelly’s violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 
330 which bars “housed-backed games” at California cardrooms. See supra notes 27-29 and 
accompanying text. Kelly’s conduct would now be lawful in California if Kelly secured a license as a 
Propositional Player. Ron Bona, California Attorney General, Third-Party Providers of Proposition 
Players Registration, available at https://oag.ca.gov/gambling/forms/forms_card.  
 177. Id. at 827. 
 178. Id. at 820 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1607). 
 179. Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1667). 
 180. Id. at 827.   
 181. Kyablue v. Watkins, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 182. Id. at 158. 
 183. Id. at 159 (“[E]ven when a contract is found to be illegal, in compelling cases it may be enforced 
to ‘avoid unjust enrichment to a defendant and a disproportionately harsh penalty upon the 
plaintiff.’”(quoting Southfield v. Barrett, 13 Cal. App. 3d 290, 294 (Ct. App. 1970))). 
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Second, the court acknowledged that while significant California 
precedent condemns gambling as violative of public policy, that precedent 
must be placed in context. More recent precedent has noted that California’s 
historic antipathy towards gambling has significantly eroded.184  
Third, the court noted that Kyablue’s arrangement with Watkins was 
limited to playing poker where poker could be lawfully played. Thus, there 
was no reason here to address the issue of criminality under Penal Code 
Section 330, or for that matter the defense of “in pari delicto.” Simply put, 
under the Kyablue-Watkin’s arrangement there was no “delicto.”185  
Fourth, the court found Kelly unpersuasive because it relied on 
decisions involving illegal gambling and the enforcement of gambling 
debt.186 Kyablue did not involve illegal gambling, nor did it involve the 
collection of gambling debt. The court emphasized the distinction between 
the public acceptance of gambling and the enforcement of gambling debt. 
California courts have refused to enforce gambling debt even when gambling 
was legal in California. The distinction is well taken. Gambling on credit 
encourages gambling and has been claimed to contribute to problem 
gambling.187 Permitting gamblingbut refusing to enforce gambling debt is 
consistent with player protection. A casino that allows a player to gamble on 
credit assumes some risk that it will not be able to collect on the debt if the 
player does not pay the debt.188 In theory, this will encourage casinos to be 
careful and diligent in the extension of credit gambling to those who can 
afford to wager more money than they physically brought to the casino. I 
say, in theory, because there are legal strategies casinos may invoke in some 
jurisdictions that will allow them to enforce gambling debt obligations 
 
 184. Id. at 159–60. 
 185. Id. at 160–61.   
 186. Id. at 160 (noting that the court in Metro. Creditors Serv. v. Sandri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Ct. App. 
1993) distinguished between gambling in general and enforcement of gambling debt in particular). The 
Kyablue court concluded: 
The clear policy against enforcement of gambling losses and debts does not control the 
decision here. Analyzing the contract’s illegality involves interpreting the public policy it 
offends, since California does not criminalize gambling outright. In this case, the pertinent 
policy concerns are with regard to gambling generally rather than the historic distaste for 
judicial resolution of “action for recovery of gambling losses and actions to enforce gambling 
debts.” 
Kyablue, 149 Cal. Rptr.3d at 160 (quoting Kelly v. First Astri Corpo., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 812 (Ct. 
App. 1999)). 
 187. See Tony Schellinck & Tracy Schrans, Identifying Problem Gamblers at the Gambling Venue: 
Finding Combinations of High Confidence Indicators, 16 J NAT’L ASS’N GAMBLING STUD. 8, 16 (2003) 
(Austl.). Credit gambling is an issue that has divided jurisdictions that have legalized gambling. See 
Responsible Gaming, Regulations and Statutes, AMERICAN GAMING ASS’N (Sept. 2019), 
https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/AGA-Responsible-Gaming-Regs-Book-
FINAL.pdf (identifying states that do or do not bar or impose restrictions on credit gambling). Recently, 
regulatory authorities in Britain barred the use of credit cards to pay for non-lottery gambling transaction 
to combat problem gambling. Kate Olton & Elizabeth Howcroft, Britain Bans Betting on Credit Cards 
to Fight Gambling Addiction, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-
gambling/brtain-bans-betting-on-credit-cards-to-fight-gambling-addiction-idUSKBN1ZD0PF.  
 188. A jurisdiction may restrict the amount of credit debt a casino may write off against taxes owed.  
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against recalcitrant player-debtors.189 That said, distinguishing between 
lawful gambling contracts and transactions and gambling debt represents a 
reasonable accommodation of competing interests in the relatively new age 
of legalized gambling. 
California thus has a somewhat unique common law approach to 
gambling. California law mirrors the part of the Statute of Anne, as judicially 
construed,190 that bars the enforcement of gambling debt, but rejects the 
remainder of the statute. Rather than taking the profit out of gambling, 
California public policy has historically taken the courts out of gambling by 
treating gambling contracts and transactions as immoral and not subject to 
judicial review, at least civilly. As Kyablue evidences, there has been some 
recent judicial pushback against the blanket treatment of gambling contracts 
and transactions as immoral and against public policy, but the case law 
remains mixed. Looking at California case law as a whole, the weight of past 
authority certainly favors the Kelly approach, even if one believes that 
decisions such as Kyablue represents a sounder, better reasoned emerging 
body of law. 
If these common law precedents were to be applied to sports betting, all 
California courts would treat sports betting as illegal conduct if sports betting 
is criminal – the issue address in Part IV of this paper. If sports betting is not 
criminal, some California courts would treat sports betting as illegal on the 
theory that gambling is immoral and, thus, contrary to the public policy of 
the state. This approach is represented by Kelly. Other courts, however, 
would not find sports betting illegal if it is not criminal. These courts rejected 
the older approach of equating gambling with immorality; rather, these 
courts see gambling contracts as simply a form of contract that parties may 
enter into, subject to the general law of California governing contract 
creation and enforcement. This approach is represented by Kyablue v. 
Watkins. 
 
Ⅵ.  FEDERAL LAW CRIMINALIZING ONLINE GAMBLING 
Two federal statutes are of primary importance in the context of online 
sports betting. The Wire Act191 and The Unlawful Internet Gambling 
 
 189. Perhaps the most extreme example of this is the Clark County, Nevada (Las Vegas) District 
Attorney’s practice of prosecuting gamblers who pay their gambling debts with a check that is 
subsequently dishonored. Joel Schectman, The Las Vegas Bad Check Unit: One of a Kind, REUTERS 
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-vegas-shell-badcheck/the-las-vegas-bad-check-
unit-one-of-a-kind-idUSL2N1C514Y.  Alternatively, the casino may sue in a jurisdiction that recognizes 
gambling debt as a legally enforceable obligation and enforce that judgement using the Full Faith & 
Credit Clause (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. See MGM Desert Inn v. Holz, 411 S.E.2d 399 (N.C. 1991)) 
(holding that Full Faith & Credit clause required recognition of Nevada default judgment for gambling 
debt). 
 190. See supra note 160 and test. 
 191. 18 U.S.C. § 1084. 
Winter 2021               IS ONLINE SPORT BETTING ILLEGAL IN CALIFORNIA? 99 
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”)192 are the principle federal laws that potentially 
apply to Debbie’s business as outlined in Example 2 earlier. The Wire Act 
prohibits the use of instruments of interstate commerce in connection with 
the business of betting. Instruments of interstate commerce would include 
online transactions.193 While there has been disagreement over the scope of 
the Wire Act, there is no disagreement that it applies to sports betting.194 The 
key term here is that the transaction must be “illegal.” By its terms UIGEA 
does not apply to legal gambling. This paper will generally focus on the Wire 
Act as the application of both the Wire Act and UIGEA to Example 2 would 
follow the same analysis. If the Wire Act does not apply to Example 2, 
UIGEA does not apply. 
UIGEA consists of two parts. First, UIGEA provides that no person or 
organization engaged in the business of betting may accept payment by 
credit card, wire or electronic funds, transfers, checks, etc., for an illegal 
internet gambling transaction.195 Second, UIGEA imposes significant 
burdens on financial institutions (e.g., banks, credit cards companies) to 
ensure that they do not facilitate or enable the use of credit cards, wire or 
electronic fund transfers, checks, etc., for illegal internet gambling.196   
The Wire Act was designed to be supplementary to state laws that made 
gambling illegal.197 The Wire Act does not criminalize wagering when 
wagering is legal under state law. Thus, sports betting, which is legal in 
several states, does not violate the Wire Act even if instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce are used to make the wager as long as the wager is legal 
in the state(s) where the wager is made and placed.  
This paper assumes that the relevant jurisdiction for determining 
whether gambling is illegal is California,198 however, that assumption is 
slightly contestable. Online communication between Customer and 
 
 192. 31 U.S.C. § 5361–5366. 
 193. United States v. Lombardo, 639 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1289 (D. Utah 2007) (“[T]he Wire Act itself, 
although enacted long before the advent of the internet, clearly contemplates any form of electronic 
transmission via wire….”); United States v. Corrar, 512 F. Supp.2d 1280 (N.D. GA. 2007) (same). That 
the Wire Act applies to online transmissions has been the consistent policy of the Department of Justice. 
See Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York to Use the Internet and Out-of-State Transaction 
Processors to Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State Adults Violate the Wire Act, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011). 
 194. The Department of Justice has taken inconsistent positions on the scope of the Wire Act. In the 
2011 Opinion cited in note 193, the Office of Legal Counsel opined that the Wire Act was limited to 
sports betting and did not encompass other forms of online gambling. In 2018, however, the DOJ reversed 
course and returned to its pre-2011 position that the Wire Act was not limited to sports betting. See 
Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2018). In New 
Hampshire Lottery Comm. v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2021) the court concluded that the DOJ got it 
right in 2011. As of the writing of this paper it is unknown whether the Biden administration will return 
to the more lenient policies expressed in the Obama administration (Note 188) or the more rigorous 
policies of the Trump administration. 
 195. 31 U.S.C. § 5363. 
 196. 31 U.S.C. § 5364.  
 197. G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, Development of the Federal Law of Gambling, 63 
CORNELL L. REV. 923, 959-965 (1978) (legislative history of Wire Act showing intent to assist, not 
preempt, states). 
 198. The other jurisdiction, Antigua, has legalized sports betting.  
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Debbie’s, as described in Example 2, may result in the incidental or 
intermediate routing of data into states, other than California, which 
expressly make sports betting by the customer illegal.  The Department of 
Justice has taken the public position that the Wire Act extends to such 
incidental routing.199 This concern led to the 2011 Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion mentioned earlier in note 193. Both Illinois and New York wished 
to sell their lottery tickets online. The sales would be intrastate, i.e., only to 
purchasers within each state; however, because it was possible that the 
incidental routing of the internet data respecting the online lottery purchase 
would cross state lines, Illinois and New York were concerned the 
transaction would be subject to the Wire Act. The 2011 opinion avoided that 
issue by opining that the Wire Act was limited to sports betting and, thus, 
did not extend to the sale of lottery tickets. The 2018 DOJ opinion did not 
address the incidental routing issue.  
Although there is some disagreement and differences of opinion among 
federal courts, most federal courts have read the interstate commerce 
requirement in federal criminal statutes broadly. Some courts have 
concluded that the mere use of instrumentality “by”, “in”, or “of” interstate 
commerce is sufficient.200 Other courts find that the incidental routing of the 
communication is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.201 This 
issue here, however, is somewhat different. It may be conceded that the use 
of the telephone or internet to place a bet satisfies the interstate commerce 
requirement. The critical issue here is whether the incidental contact the wire 
transmission has with a state that makes sports betting illegal is sufficient to 
 
 199. Letter dated January 2, 2004, from David M. Nissman, U.S. Attorney, District of the Virgin 
Islands, to Judge Eileen R. Peterson, Chair of the U.S. Virgin Islands Casino Control Commission: 
While several federal statutes are applicable to Internet gambling, the principal statutes are 
Section 1084… of Title 18, United States Code…[W]e believe that the acceptance of wagers 
by gambling businesses located in the Virgin Islands from individuals located either outside of 
the Virgin Islands or within the Virgin Islands (but where the transmission is routed outside of 
the Virgin Islands) would itself violate federal law…. 
See also Mark Hichar, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Act of 2006 Is Not a Greenlight for 
Intrastate Internet Gambling, PUB. GAMBLING INFO. (November 2006), 
https://www.pgridigitallibrary.com/uploads/4/3/1/5/43157305/hichar_2006_november.pdf (noting 
consistent DOI policy that “Existing Federal Law Prohibits Intrastate Gambling, Unless the Electronic 
Wagering Data Remains in the State”). The issue of “incidental routing” was not addressed in DOJ’s 
most recent pronouncement on the scope of the Wire Act. See supra note 194. 
 200. In United States v. Davila, 592 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1979) the court held that incidental interstate 
routing of a Western Union wire transfer satisfied the interstate commerce requirement of the federal wire 
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1843. In Davila, funds transferred between two banks located in the state of 
Texas were routed through the state of Virginia. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
interstate nexus was “too minimal and incidental” to satisfy the statute’s jurisdictional element. The court 
concluded that the wire transfers “were essential” to carrying out the offenses charged, “and they went of 
necessity on interstate facilities.” Id. at 1264. See also United States v. Laedeke, No. CR 16–33–BLG–
SPW, 2016 WL 5390106 (D. Mont. Sept. 26, 2016) (wire fraud prosecution; interstate commerce 
requirement satisfied by in-state email messaging that was incidentally routed out of state.). 
 201. United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that interstate use of the 
telephone constituted use of a facility of interstate commerce); United States v. Mandel, 647 F.3d 710 
(7th Cir. 2011). 
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allow the federal government to use that state’s position to support a Wire 
Act prosecution based on transmission that begins and ends between 
jurisdictions that permit sports betting.  
The primary argument against treating “incidental routing” as 
triggering the laws of states that touch the transmission is UIGEA. UIGEA 
expressly provides that incidental routing of data into another state does not 
affect the intrastate character of the transaction.202 The argument is that 
Congress would not intend to exempt intrastate transactions with incidental 
routing from the requirements of the UIGEA if those same transactions were 
illegal under the Wire Act. And while the Department of Justice has publicly 
rejected this approach,203 it has not brought a Wire Act prosecution based on 
the theory that “incidental routing” would support the use of the law of a 
jurisdiction that touched the transmission to support the Wire Act 
prosecution. 
It may be noted that the sports betting transaction in Example 2 does 
not involve an “intrastate” transaction, but it is clearly one that is 
international, because Antigua is outside the United States. This observation 
is technically correct but misses the larger issue in play. The critical issue is 
whether the incidental routing of the wire transaction through a state that 
treats sports betting as illegal is sufficient to allow that state’s laws to be 
applied to characterize the transaction as illegal. For this purpose, whether 
the wire transmission is intrastate (within the state for purposes of sending 
and receipt), or interstate (within different states for the purposes of sending 
and receipt), or international is irrelevant; the critical issue is the state of law 
at the point of sending and the point of receipt. As long as the transmission 
is legal at both points, both interested jurisdictions have expressed their 
position. Jurisdictions through which the wire transaction only travels due to 
transmission issues have no interest in having their law applied to the 
transactions regardless of whether the transaction is intrastate, interstate, or 
international. It is difficult to see what interest incidental routing states would 
have in applying their law to a transaction that has no impact on the state’s 
residents or to the protection of the state’s residents. It is analogous to a state 
seeking to apply its laws on the use of alcohol to a commercial passenger jet 
flying over the state. 
There were efforts in the 113th and 114th Congress to amend the Wire 
Act to specifically reference “incidental routing.”204 For example, House 
 
 202. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(E). 
 203. Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2006: Hearing on H.R. 4777 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) 
(statement by Bruce G. Ohr, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States 
Department of Justice). See also Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 
42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2018) (reiteration of position that intrastate exemption in UIGEA does not apply to the 
Wire Act). 
 204. These various proposals were put forth under the title “Restore America’s Wire Act.” Versions 
of this legislation were introduced in the 113th and 114th Congressional sessions. See Senate Bill S. 2159, 
113th Cong. (2014) and House Measure H.R. 4301, 113th Cong. (2014) each of which was introduced in 
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Measure H.R. 707 would have expressly included “incidental” transmission 
as satisfying the interstate commerce requirement. See, e.g., H.R. 707 (114th 
Cong. 1st Sess.) §2 (Wire Act Clarifications), at § C(3): 
 
The term ‘uses a wire communications facility for the transmission of 
interstate or foreign commerce of any bet or wager’ includes any 
transmission over the internet carried interstate or in foreign commerce, 
incidentally or otherwise….205 
 
It is not entirely clear what the added term “incidentally” would have 
accomplished. It is well accepted that the “use” of a telephone or the internet 
is interstate commerce even if the call or internet transaction involves 
persons within the same state. The added term “incidentally” has importance 
if it would allow the application of a state’s laws through which the call or 
transaction was incidentally routed to determine if the bet was illegal. 
However, the language does not specifically address this application. None 
of the measures made it out of committee, and the committee records and 
hearings are silent on this particular point. This issue will, however, rise in 
importance as more states legalize sports betting and the routing of online 
bets through states that do and do not permit sports betting becomes more 
prominent.  
This still leaves us with the question whether, pursuant to the facts of 
Example 2, Debbie’s could be prosecuted under the federal Wire Act based 
on the argument that the transaction was illegal under California law. How 
is “illegality” understood under the Wire Act? Does it require that the 
conduct be criminal under California law or is it sufficient that the conduct 
is prohibited, based on norms of morality and public policy? 
Federal courts have found that the Wire Act can apply even though the 
state has not made gambling (sports wagering) a criminal act as long as the 
state treats sports wagering as illegal. In United States v. Cohen206 the 
defendant was charged with Wire Act violations for accepting sports bets in 
Antigua from customers (law enforcement personnel) in New York. Cohen’s 
business model was essentially the same as described in Example 2 of this 
paper. Cohen argued that they could not be prosecuted for Wire Act 
violations because while New York treated bookmaking as “illegal,” it did 
not treat bookmaking as a “crime.”207 The court rejected Cohen’s claim. The 
court noted that Cohen relied on the Wire Act’s “safe harbor” provision that 
exempts interstate transmission of sports betting information that is (1) legal 
in both the place of origin and the place of destination and (2) the 
 
the 113th Congress, and Senate Bill S. 1668, 114th Cong. (2015) and House Measure H.R. 707, 114th 
Cong. (2015) in the 114th Congress. 
 205. Restoration of America’s Wire Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations of the Comm. on the Judicary H.R., 114th Cong. (2015).  
 206. United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 207. Id. at 74-75. 
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transmission is limited to information that assists in the placing of sports bets 
as opposed to making the bets themselves.208 The safe harbor provision (18 
U.S.C. § 1084(b)) does not use the term “criminal,” it uses the term “legal.” 
The court concluded that the safe harbor provision would only apply it sports 
betting was legal in the affected jurisdictions. 
This is why the analysis of California statutory and common law is 
critical. Even if a customer placing a bet is not a criminal act, to escape Wire 
Act prosecution Debbie’s must show that sports betting is not illegal. This is 
where the Kelly v. First Astri Corp / Kyablue v. Watkins debate becomes 
critical.209 Kelly takes the position that sports betting is illegal; thus, if Kelly 
is followed, a Wire Act prosecution against Debbie’s can be made.210 On the 
other hand, under Kyablue, gambling that has not specifically been made 
criminal should be seen as legal. Thus, if Kyablue is followed, sports betting 
in California, as set out in Example 2, would not support a Wire Act 
prosecution, if the view was accepted that the Customer’s actions do not 
constitute a violation of Penal Code Section 337a(a)(6), for the reasons set 
out in Part IV of this paper. 
Under the Wire Act, there is also a distinction between transmission of 
information assisting in the placing of bets and the transmission of the actual 
bets themselves. The Act prohibits one engaged in the business of betting or 
wagering from knowingly using “a wire communication facility for the 
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or 
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event 
or context….”211 
The Act’s safe harbor provision carves out an exception that covers the 
transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets but not the 
transmission of actual bets themselves.212 Debbie’s would certainly argue 
that its conduct falls within the safe harbor provision because only 
“information assisting the placing of bets” occurs in California, the bet itself 
is placed in Antigua. The question, thus, is what does “information assisting 
in the placing of bets” mean? 
Although the issue has not been as clearly stated as one would like, the 
incidental routing issue is tied to the placing of bets. When the Wire Act and 
other federal statutes addressing gambling (except UIGEA) were adopted, 
the focus was on organized crime. In that pre-internet world, betting was a 
more personal endeavor and the focus of these federal statutes was to strike 
at organized crime by depriving it of the profits of gambling.213 The question 
 
 208. Id.  
 209. See Text and Notes 170-190. 
 210. The Wire Act is not used to prosecute customers as it is limited to those in the business of 
bookmaking. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 211. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). 
 212. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b). 
 213. The Department of Justice asserted in 1974, shortly after the Organized Crime Control Act was 
passed: 
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here is whether and how a statute drafted with specific goals in the pre-
internet era can and should be applied to internet transactions. 
The Wire Act criminalized both the transmission of a bet and the 
transmission of information that assists in the placing of bets.214 The “Safe 
Harbor” provision, however, exempts information that assists in the placing 
of bets from criminal sanction if the information is transmitted from and into 
a state or states in which such betting is legal.215 The question thus reduces 
itself to how “placing a bet” differs from “information assisting in the placing 
of bets.” Debbie’s will argue that in Example 2, no “bet was placed” until 
Debbie’s accepted and consummated the bet in Antigua.216 All Customer did 
was transmit “information that assisted in the placing of the bet.” 
Most decisions addressing this issue have focused on the criminalizing 
aspect of Section 1084(a), i.e., did the defendant violate the Wire Act 
because the defendant received information that assisted in the placing of 
bets. Thus, courts have found that Section 1084(a)’s transmission of 
information proscribed was violated when the defendant provided 
information such as stories on the playing status of athletes or providing 
scores.217 Providing betting odds would satisfy this standard.218 In this 
context, the transmission of information prong of Section 1084(a) essentially 
complements the placing of bets prong. Bookmaking operations commonly 
use both prongs in their operations.219 Courts have also held that providing 
information necessary for the placement of bets, such as providing account 
numbers and PINs constitutes information that assists in the placing of 
bets.220 Debbie’s would argue that information transmitted to enable a bet 
(account numbers, PINs) is fundamentally no different from Customer 
sending information to Debbie’s that enables Debbie’s to consummate a bet 
in that jurisdiction. Although it may appear strange that Debbie’s, as the 
defendant, would argue for a broad interpretation of “information assisting” 
in Section 1084(a), Debbie’s reasoning is logical if its argument is that the 
same interpretation should be given to the identical language in the Safe 
 
It is the unanimous conclusion of the President, the Congress and law enforcement officials 
that illegal organized gambling is the largest single source of revenue for organized crime…. 
[It] provides the initial investment for narcotic trafficking, hijacking operations, prostitution 
rings, and loan-shark schemes. 
Quoted in United States v. Fatico, 458 F.Supp. 388, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein, J.) (also noting 
that the Department’s position has been disputed). 
 214. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). 
 215. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b). United States v. Ross, No. 98 CR.1174–1(KMV), 1999 WL 782749 (S.D. 
N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999) (“Read together [Section 1084(a) and (b)] impose federal criminal liability… for 
some conduct (the transmission of ‘information assisting in the placing of bets’) where, but only where, 
gambling is not legal in both jurisdictions where the transaction occurs….”). 
 216. Ross, supra note 215, slip op. at *4. 
 217. United States v. Reeder, 614 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 218. United States v. Corrar, 512 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 2017). 
 219. See H.R. REP. No. 87 – 967, at 1–2 (1961) (stating that “the immediate receipt of information as 
to the results of a horse-race” exemplifies information that assists gambling operations). 
 220. United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 718 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that providing account numbers 
is required to place a bet with the defendant); United States v. Corrar, 512 F.Supp.2d at 1288. 
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Harbor provision.221 In other words, if Debbie’s conduct constitutes criminal 
information assistance under Section 1084(a), it necessarily constitutes 
“information assistance” under the Safe Harbor provision of Section 
1084(b). This, however, creates a conundrum: providing information 
assistance must necessarily be different from the placing of bets, otherwise 
the language in Section 1084(a) is redundant, which violates a fundamental 
canon of construction.222 
No court has accepted or rejected the above argument. In the few 
decisions that have addressed the scope of the Wire Act’s Safe Harbor 
provision, the courts have tended to adopt a transaction focus that assesses 
how close the information assistance is to the bettor’s actions that initiate the 
bet. For example, in United States v. Ross,223 the court was confronted with 
a transaction that mirrored Example 2. The defendant argued that no bet was 
made or placed until the transaction was actually consummated in Curacao, 
where the transaction was legal. The bettor simply made an offer to contract, 
which was essentially information that assisted in the making of a bet.224 The 
government argued that the bets were made when the bettor (a government 
agent) made the bet and the bet itself was merely “recorded” in Curacao.225 
The Ross court appeared to concede that the Wire Act was ambiguous 
when it came to differentiating and providing information assisting in the 
placing of a bet, for the court proceeded to craft a test that the court felt met 
the concerns that courts have identified as central to the statute.226 The court 
also identified its test as the more reasonable interpretation of Congress’s 
distinction between “bet” and “information,” thus, also conceding that 
defendant’s reading of the Wire Act was “reasonable.” 
The test the Ross court proposed was to identify how close the 
informational assistance was to the actual initiation of the bet. Background 
information, such as the posting of odds, the providing of account numbers, 
etc., was seen as fundamentally distinct from the initiation of the transaction 
by the making of an offer to place a bet.227  
The Ross decision does have the benefit of certainty; however, that 
certainty is achieved by an artificial hierarchy that results in similar language 
having one meaning in Section 1084(a) of the Wire Act, but a different 
 
 221. It is a fundamental canon of construction that language in a statute should receive a consistent 
interpretation unless the contrary is unmistakably clear. 
 222. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall 
be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage. See United States v. Menasche, 348 
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Com., 743 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Cal 1987) 
(“A construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.”). 
 223. United States v. Ross, No. 98 CR.1174–1(KMV), 1999 WL 782749 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999). 
 224. Id. at *4. 
 225. Id. 
 226. This concern appears to be that the Wire Act “reach those transactions in which callers place 
bets with bookmakers via the telephone because that is what ‘persons engaged in the business of betting 
or wagering’ do; ‘[b]ookies take bets, they receive them, they handle them.’” Id., (quoting United States 
v. Tomeo, 459 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1972)) (footnote omitted). 
 227. See supra Note 223, at *4. 
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construction in the Wire Act’s Safe Harbor provisions (Section 1084(b). 
Treating the terms consistently in both provisions would, however, be 
consistent with general judicial rules of statutory construction. The 
consequence of doing so would be that the Wire Act would not be able to 
capture all forms of betting made possible by modern technology. But that 
result is the consequence of a statute that was written in the pre-internet, pre-
modern financial world. The Wire Act, drafted in the early 1960’s, simply 
cannot be stretched and massaged to address transactions unforeseen (and 
probably unforeseeable) at that time. Trying to accommodate “horse and 
buggy” statutes to “jet age” problems is a difficult endeavor. Here is an 
example where it might be preferable for courts to read the Wire Act as a 
statute of its time and leave it to Congress to amend or revise the Wire Act, 
if so desired, to reach internet transactions that often defy traditional 
territorial boundaries.  
Ⅶ.  CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to show in this paper that a reasonable case can be 
made for the proposition that the type of online sports betting arrangement 
set out in Example 2 is not presently illegal under California law, and thereby 
not illegal under federal law. When only the bet is made in California by the 
customer, a person not in the business of bookmaking, it is reasonable to 
interpret California Penal Code Section 337a(a)(6) as not applicable to the 
transactions.228 It is more reasonable to interpret Section 337a(a)(6) as 
applicable to bookmakers, rather than customers. Even if Section 337a(a)(6) 
is extended to customer betting, it is simply unreasonable to ignore a pattern 
of non-enforcement of Section 337a against customers since the statute was 
enacted in 1909 as evidencing anything other than an accepted practice that 
the statute will not be enforced to the letter of the law.229 This paper has also 
shown that common law proscriptions against gambling have significantly 
eroded in California, leaving little in place of the old broad view that 
gambling was illegal and violated the state’s public policy, other than a 
refusal to recognize the lawfulness of gambling debt for purposes of judicial 
enforcement.230 These twin findings lead, in turn, to the conclusion that 
federal proscriptions against sports betting fail because they depend on 
sports betting to be illegal under state law to be proscribed by federal law.231 
When one looks in detail at the way California and the federal government 
address sports betting, one walks away with the strong conviction that neither 
jurisdiction has addressed the issue with sufficient clarity and precision to 
justify criminalizing such transaction, particularly when structured as in 
Example 2. 
 
 228. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra notes 99-133 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra Part IV. 
 231. See supra Part Ⅵ. 
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I am not suggesting that efforts to address sports betting in California 
by legislation and/or constitutional amendment are not necessary. California 
law on gambling is well developed, albeit largely dated, and exerts a strong 
gravitational pull to trap new methods of gambling that resemble those forms 
expressly prohibited. The argument in this paper is just that – an argument. 
Specific legislation defining the terms and conditions under which sports 
betting can be conducted will provide the certainty many proponents of 
sports betting would like to see.232 Of course, specific legalization may also 
constrict the opportunity to engage in sports betting.233 Sports betting will 
eventually be legal in California. It will come about either through official 
means that will delineate the terms and conditions under which sports betting 
may be conducted or it will arrive surreptitiously, sponsored by risk takers 
who will promote their online sports betting operation because sports betting 
is a large market. Sports betting will thus eventually come to California 
either through legal action (legislative or initiative) or through ongoing 



















 232. SCA 6 proposed by Senator Bill Dodd (note 7) represents a fair, comprehensive, and balanced 
approach to legalizing sports betting (and other gambling activities) in California. That did not prevent 
special interests from criticizing the measure. 
 233. The California Legalize Sports Betting on Indian Lands Initiative (#19-0029) is a constitutional 
Initiative that Native America Tribal Casino owners have qualified for the November 2022 ballot. 
Ballotpedia, California 2022 ballot propositions, available at 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_2022_ballot_propositions. The measure would allow sports betting 
only at Tribal casinos and at race tracks. Not surprisingly, as the measure is sponsored by Tribal casino 
owners, the measure would also expand the types of gambling games that could be offered by Tribal 
casinos beyond that authorized by Proposition 1A, which was earlier approved as a constitutional 
amendment. See text and notes 44-51. The California Legalize Sports Betting on American Indian Lands 
Initiative can be reviewed at 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Legalize_Sports_Betting_on_American_Indian_Lands_Initiative_(20
22).  
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